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SUMMARY
Clustering is often the first step performed to assist us in finding structure within un-
labeled datasets. Given a small set of labels, clustering also enables us to propagate these
labels by discovering groups of objects that are similar to each other. The ever-growing
amount of data being collected over a long period of time brings us many challenging op-
portunities to conduct clustering. Analyzing such long-term datasets allows us to solve
evolving security problems such as: botnet forensic analysis; early warning of new threats;
and the evolution of security phenomena. However, the analysis also faces the challenge
presented by noise in the data.
This thesis improves the robustness of clustering against noise by focusing on DNS
graphs. Noise is either inherent in the dataset, or can be injected by adversaries. The first
goal of the thesis is to remediate the effect of the noise inherent in the data. To that end, we
perform measurement studies from two different vantage points in the online advertising
ecosystem. As a multi-billion dollar industry, the online ad ecosystem naturally attracts
ad abuse from miscreants. We propose a new clustering technique to automatically ana-
lyze the costs of impression fraud to advertisers generated by the botnet TDSS/TDL4 over
four years. In addition, our measurement results show statistically significant differences
between blacklisted publishers compared to those that were never blacklisted, from the
vantage point of a Demand Side Platform provider.
The second goal of the thesis is to increase the robustness of clustering against adver-
sarial noise. Little work has been done in adversarial clustering in order to understand the
weaknesses of clustering systems. We propose two novel attacks, one that injects noise
to existing clusters, and one that moves data points to noisy clusters. After analyzing the
effectiveness and the cost of attacks, we present defense techniques that improve the ro-
bustness of clustering in adversarial settings.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Datasets are being generated at an unprecedented rate, which brings challenges to ana-
lyze them. Nowadays, large corporations collect and store Petabytes of data [1, 2]. With
smartphones and the internet-of-things devices generating a wide variety of new data, the
increase in dataset size is only going to become more significant. Finding meaningful infor-
mation from massive amounts of data requires considerably more effort, especially when
the datasets are entirely or largely unlabeled.
Clustering is often the first step taken in an effort to find structure within unlabeled
datasets. Additionally, when there is a small set of available seed labels, clustering may
also be performed to propagate the labels. Repeating this process over time can help us
understand the evolution of threats. For example, clustering long-term datasets enables
botnet forensic analysis, provides early warning of new threats, and tracks the evolution
of security phenomena. Performing such an analytical process reliably requires solutions
for the challenge presented by noise. This noise can be inherent in the data, or injected by
adversaries. The ability to handle noise is thus essential to perform clustering at scale.
This thesis aims to improve the robustness of clustering against noise by analyzing DNS
graphs. We mine two types of DNS bipartite graphs: 1) the domain names resolution graph
that represents Internet hosting infrastructure, i.e., passive DNS datasets; and 2) the graph
of hosts querying domain names.
The first goal of the thesis is to deal with the inherent noise in the dataset. For example,
in the passive DNS graph, domains can point to noisy internet infrastructure if the owners
decide to “park” them. In the graph of hosts querying domains, infected hosts carry out
a variety of benign activities, which adds noise to malicious behavior. We propose a new
clustering technique that is robust against inherent noise in the DNS graph.
1
We apply our novel technique to measure the impression fraud generated by the TDSS/TDL4
botnet. Impression fraud is a severe problem in the online advertising ecosystem, which
is a multi-billion dollar industry. While most efforts have been focused on remediating
click fraud, the online advertising industry has only just started to draft standards [3, 4]
for detecting fraudulent impressions. For defenders, impression fraud is a significantly
harder problem to solve compared to click fraud. Therefore, conducting impression fraud
is a high-return and low-risk monetization method employed by attackers. Using our ro-
bust clustering technique, we are able to automatically measure the lower-bound loss of
advertisers caused by TDSS/TDL4, over four years of the botnet’s lifetime. In comparison,
related work either relies on manual effort undertaken by law enforcement [5, 6], or only
limits the study to small time periods such as two weeks [7].
Our TDSS/TDL4 study provides a vantage point of infected machines, which is outside
of the ad ecosystem. We also study the ad abuse that can be observed from within the
ad ecosystem, from the vantage point of Demand Side Platform (DSP) providers. Our
analysis shows that traditional blacklists can be used to understand malicious publishers
seen within the ad ecosystem. However, deploying blacklists is not sufficient due to very
small overlap between blacklists and publishers. Since the few blacklisted publishers do
not associate with noisy hosting infrastructure on the DSP graph, we use a simple graph
connected component analysis to track malicious publishers. In addition, our measurement
results show that the behavior of blacklisted publishers differs significantly from those that
have never been blacklisted. Therefore, building a reputation system is possible within the
ad ecosystem.
The second goal of the thesis is to make clustering systems more robust against ad-
versarial noise. If a detection system is deployed, attackers will try to evade it. Many
researchers have shown that classifiers can be evaded [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 13, 16,
17, 18]. On the other hand, limited attention has been paid to adversarial clustering [19,
20]. We face the challenge that the result of clustering depends on all the data points being
2
clustered. By contrast, related work can compute classification features directly from one
data point, e.g., image, PDF, phishing page, network packet, or exploit. Therefore, we have
to consider attackers with different knowledge levels in our threat model.
In adversarial settings, an attacker can either inject noise to existing clusters, or she can
move meaningful data points to noisy clusters. We propose two novel attacks that generate
the two types of adversarial noise. Furthermore, we analyze the cost of the attacks, and
present methods to increase the cost for the attackers to evade clustering. Our adversarial
clustering analysis can identify the weaknesses of a clustering system, which enables us to
improve the system for the defender.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
This thesis makes the following technical contributions:
• New Clustering Technique: We develop a spectral expansion technique that is ro-
bust against inherent noise in the data. Our technique can reliably extend the set of
botnet seed domains from a few days of ground truth to four years.
• New Measurement Results in DSP: Our measurement results show that malicious
ad campaigns have statistically significant differences in traffic and lookup patterns
from benign ones. These new findings suggest that reputation systems for advertise-
ment publishers are possible.
• New Adversarial Clustering Analysis: We present two novel attacks against graph-
based clustering, and two defense techniques that reduce the effectiveness of the
attacks. The attacks can be used to improve the robustness of the clustering system
against adversarial noise.
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1.1.1 Financial Lower Bounds of Online Advertising Abuse
From the edge of the online ad ecosystem, we develop the Ad-abuse Analysis System
(A2S), which is able to analyze one of the most complex, sophisticated, and long-lived
botnets: TDSS/TDL4. The ad-abuse module of TDSS/TDL4 uses a server-side DGA algo-
rithm to generate related C&C domains. The malware does not contain the DGA algorithm,
but receives the domains in config files from the C&C server. The bots receive commands
to conduct ad abuse, which causes advertisers to lose money.
The goal of A2S is to estimate lower bounds of the advertisers’ financial loss caused by
the botnet using data-driven approaches. With this knowledge, network operators, such as
large Internet Service Providers (ISPs), can design network policies to reduce both (1) the
economic gains for adversaries that monetize ads and (2) the overall impact a botnet may
have to the online ad ecosystem and the advertisers. We develop the spectral expansion
module in A2S to reliably extend the seed of ad-abuse C&C domains. After running the
spectral expansion algorithm 2,590 times, we increased the set of ad-abuse C&C domains
to almost four times the size of the seed set, with a very low (3 out of 838) false positive
rate.
Using four years of network datasets from one of the largest ISPs in North America, we
study: (1) the network infrastructure necessary to support the ad-abuse operation and (2)
the financial model to estimate abuse the botnet inflicts on advertisers. Our major findings
include:
• Online advertisers lost at least US$346 million to TDSS/TDL4. This amount is based
solely on the actions of less than 15% of the botnet population. This translates to
more than US$340 thousand per day on average, and the abuse was mostly accom-
plished by impression fraud. It is worth noting that daily abuse levels are three times
of recent results reported for the ZeroAccess botnet [7] and as large as ten times of
the short-lived DNSChanger [21] botnet.
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• With respect to the infrastructure that supported this botnet operation, adversaries
employed a level of network agility to achieve monetization similar to traditional
botnet C&C communication. At least 228 IP addresses and 863 domain names were
used to support the ad-abuse operation over four years. The domain names are avail-
able here [22].
1.1.2 Measuring Network Reputation in the Ad-Bidding Process
From within the online ad ecosystem, we investigate the potential of using public threat
data to measure and detect adware and malicious affiliate traffic from the perspective of
Demand Side Platforms (DSP). A DSP facilitates ad bidding between ad exchanges and
advertisers. In summary, we found that:
• There are 13,324 (0.27%) known malicious domains generating bid request traffic
through the ad exchanges in our datasets. On average, they generate 1.8% of the
overall bid requests daily, much less than previously published values [23, 24]. How-
ever, we can use public blacklists to identify 68.28% of domains before they appeared
in DSP traffic. This suggests traditional sources of maliciousness are valuable, but
insufficient to fully understand ad-abuse from the perspective of the DSPs.
• On average, blacklisted publisher domains tend to use more ad exchanges (average:
1.85) and reach more clients (average: 5109.47) compared to non-blacklisted do-
mains (average ad exchanges: 1.43, average hashed client IP addresses: 568.78).
This suggests that reputation systems for ad publishers are possible.
• Contrary to the observation of blacklisted publisher domains, malware domains use
a similar number of ad exchanges (average: 1.44), but are seen from more hashed
client IP addresses (average: 2310.75), compared to publisher domains that are never
queried by malware (average ad exchanges: 1.43, average hashed client IP addresses:
485.36).
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Furthermore, we can use simple graph analysis and maliciousness heuristics to track
malicious infrastructure observed by ad exchanges. Among the campaigns ranked the high-
est (top 0.1%), we found new cases including PUP, DGAs and malware sites.
1.1.3 Adversarial Analysis of Graph-based Detection System
We present the first practical attempt to attack graph-based modeling techniques in the con-
text of network security. To that end, we devise two novel attacks (namely, targeted noise
injection and small community attacks) against three commonly used graph clustering or
embedding techniques, namely; i) Community Discovery, ii) Singular Value Decomposi-
tion (SVD), and iii) node2vec. Using three different classes of real world datasets (a US
telecommunication dataset, a US university dataset and a threat feed) and after considering
three classes of adversaries (adversaries with minimal, moderate and perfect knowledge)
we mount these two new attacks against the graph modeling component of a state of the
art network detection system: specifically, Pleiades [25]. We use the classifier model to
test whether and how likely each cluster belongs to the real DGA malware family, both be-
fore and after the attack. Then, we present the overall distribution of such predicted class
probabilities to evaluate the impact of the attacks.
The targeted noise injection attack injects vertices and edges to copy the graph structure
of the original signal, which forces noise into the resulting clusters. In minimal knowledge,
we create a DGA algorithm that can be classified as benign, effectively evading the classi-
fier, to generate noisy domains for injection. In moderate knowledge, we use unpopular do-
mains from a different network as noise. In perfect knowledge, we use unpopular domains
from the same network traffic as noise. While more knowledgeable attackers typically fare
better, we demonstrate that even minimal knowledge attackers are strong. Attackers with
no knowledge beyond their infections can render the predicted class probabilities of 84% of
the new clusters drops to zero. The attacks can be performed at a low cost to the adversary
by not appearing to be anomalous. The majority of hosts had little change in “suspicious-
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ness”, whereas a small percentage of hosts increased their suspiciousness after the targeted
noise injection attacks.
Our small community attack abuses the known property of small communities in graphs
to subdivide and separate clusters into one or more unrelated clusters. Community discov-
ery is resistant to the small community attack due to the high costs it would cause the
attacker, however, spectral methods and node2vec are both vulnerable to the small commu-
nity attack. We measure the cost of attacks by the decrease in the attacker graph density.
Node2vec offers more adversarial resistance than SVD because the attack cost is higher.
We propose two defense techniques that could help Pleiades retain its detection capabil-
ities — with the respect of the two proposed attacks. The first one is training the classifier
with noise, which shows promise in remediating the noise injection attack to some extent.
The second one is using the small community attack as an adversarial guideline to choose
better hyperparamaters for graph embeddings, which can lower the attack success rate from
75% to 25%.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
In Chapter 2, we introduce different graph clustering methods that we will use in the the-
sis. We also describe the online advertising ecosystem and discuss the vantage points for
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
In the first part of this dissertation (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), we study impression fraud
from both outside and inside the online advertising ecosystem. Specifically, we propose a
new clustering technique to measure lower bound of advertiser’s loss due to impression
fraud generated by the botnet TDSS/TDL4, in Chapter 3. Our new technique generates
very low false positives, and thus can improve the robustness of clustering against inherent
noise in the data. In Chapter 4, we use clustering to track malicious publishers observed by
a DSP, and also perform measurement study for the publisher reputation. Our results point
to the direction of promising features for building a publisher reputation system.
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In the second part of this dissertation (Chapter 5), we improve the robustness of clus-
tering against adversarial noise. We design and evaluate two novel graph attacks against
a state-of-the-art network-level, graph-based detection system. Our work highlights areas
in adversarial machine learning that have not yet been addressed, specifically: graph-based
clustering techniques, and a global feature space where realistic attackers without perfect
knowledge must be accounted for (by the defenders) in order to be practical. To conclude
the adversarial analysis, we propose two defense techniques that can improve the robust-
ness of the clustering system.
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6. Section 6.1 summarizes the contributions. In
Section 6.2, we discuss additional attack cost for generalizing the adversarial analysis to




2.1 Graph Clustering Methods
Many security datasets can be represented as graphs. Clustering is a common task per-
formed to analyze these security graphs. The two basic assumptions employed by graph
clustering techniques are homophily and structural equivalence. The homophily assump-
tion is based on the notion that, “birds of a feather flock together”. In other words, nodes
that associate with each other are more alike. The corresponding clustering methods have
been widely used in security applications. Community discovery identifies criminal net-
works [26], spectral clustering on graphs discovers botnet infrastructure [25], hierarchi-
cal clustering identifies similar malware samples [27, 28], and the associations in binary
download graph can group potential malware download events [29, 30]. On the other hand,
the structural equivalence assumption states that nodes with similar structural roles (e.g.,
sink nodes) should be in the same cluster, or, have similar graph embeddings. Newly de-
vised graph embedding methods (e.g., DeepWalk [31], node2vec [32]) balance homophily
and structural equivalence using node neighborhoods sampled by random walks. These
methods could further improve the state of the art in the application of graph clustering in
security research.
In this section, we explain graph clustering methods that will be used in the thesis.
2.1.1 Connected Component
In graph theory, within a connected component, any two vertices are connected, but there
are no paths connecting the vertices that are in different components. Breadth-First Search
and Depth-First Search algorithms can both compute the connected components of a graph.
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We apply the connected component discovery in Chapter 4 to track malicious advertising
campaigns.
2.1.2 Community Detection
There are many ways to detect communities in a graph. Several techniques in this space rely
on a modularity metric to evaluate the quality of partitions, which measures the density of
links inside and outside communities. This allows an algorithm to optimize modularity for
community discovery communities. The Louvain algorithm [33] scales to large networks
with hundreds of millions of vertices. Communities are usually hierarchical [34, 35, 36];
however, finding sub-communities within communities is a known hard problem [37]. This
allows attackers to hide sub-communities in a “noisy” community by adding edges. We
evaluate the community detection algorithm in adversarial settings in Chapter 5.
2.1.3 Spectral Methods
In [38], Braverman et al. discuss several popular spectral clustering strategies. First, a sim-
ilarity matrix is used to represent the graph. Each row and each column represent a vertex
to be clustered, and the weight is a similarity score between the corresponding vertices.
After proper normalization, the matrix M is used as input to singular value decomposition
(SVD) of rank k, SV Dk(M) = UΣV ∗. When the resulting eigenvectors (e.g., vectors in
U ) are further normalized, they can be used as an embedding in a euclidean space for learn-
ing tasks. In spectral methods, the hyperparameter k is usually chosen by first evaluating
the scree plot of eigenvalues to identify the “elbow” where higher ranks have diminishing
returns of representing the input matrix. When the scree plot starts to plateau at the ith
eigenvalue, we set k = i [39, 40].
Spectral clustering with SVD is known to have limitations when clusters are imbal-
anced; this is due to either graphs being scale-free (power law distribution) [41], or when
small communities exist [42]. Unfortunately, both commonly occur in real-world data. In
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practice, these small communities are merged into what is colloquially called the “death
star” cluster: a large, noisy cluster that contains many small communities.
In Chapter 3, we propose a new spectral expansion algorithm, which uses spectral clus-
tering, to analyze the impression fraud problem of the botnet TDSS/TDL4. In Chapter 5,
we also analyze the robustness of spectral clustering in adversarial settings.
2.1.4 node2vec
Contrary to the strong homophily assumption of community detection and spectral cluster-
ing, node2vec [32] has the advantage of balancing homophily and structural equivalence
in its embeddings. For example, vertices that are sink nodes will have similar embeddings.
node2vec generates embeddings of vertices by optimizing the sum of the log likelihood of





Where f(v) is the embedding of vertex v, NS(v) represents the network neighborhoods
of v with a series of vertices obtained by the sampling strategy S. node2vec proposes a
sampling strategy by random walks starting from every vertex on the graph with the fol-
lowing parameters: 1) number of walks from each vertex, 2) length of each walk, 3) prob-
ability to return to the same vertex (Breadth First Search), and 4) probability to explore
out to further vertices (Depth First Search). Once the walk samples have been obtained,
node2vec uses a tunable neighborhood size to get the neighborhood of vertices. For exam-
ple, a walk with length 5 {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5} generates the following neighborhoods with
size 3: N(v1) = {v2, v3, v4}, N(v2) = {v3, v4, v5}.
In order to compute the embeddings given f(v), Equation 2.1 is factorized as a product
of the conditional probability of each vertex in the neighborhood based on the conditional
independence assumption. Each underlying conditional probability is defined as a sigmoid
function, and the embeddings are learned by stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with neg-
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Figure 2.1: A brief overview of online advertising ecosystem.
ative sampling optimization. Effectively, node2vec learns embeddings in a fashion similar
to word2vec [43] but does not use skip-grams. Attackers can target the neighborhood size
and sampling parameters to encourage their vertices to be under-sampled and thus split into
multiple noisy clusters. In Chapter 5, we evaluate node2vec in adversarial settings.
2.2 Online Advertising Ecosystem
Our study in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are from two different vantage points in the online
advertising ecosystem. In Chapter 3, we are from vantage point V1 (Figure 2.1), which is
at the edge of the ad ecosystem, between infected machines and DNS/HTTP servers they
connect to. In Chapter 4, we observe the ad bidding requests within the ad ecosystem at
vantage point V2, between ad exchanges and a DSP. To explain that, we describe the ad
ecosystem in this section.
Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the online advertising ecosystem. There are three major
components in the ad ecosystem: supplier, demander, and the marketplace. Suppliers are
the publishers who provide ad inventories (e.g., spaces in the webpage), to show ads. Each
time an ad is shown is called an impression. As “demanders”, advertisers wish to secure the
optimal ad inventories to reach the most relevant audiences. Various entities in the market
place connect the demand the supply, which we use illustrate next.
When a user visits a publisher webpage (step 1, Figure 2.1), elements of the webpages
are loaded (step 2), during which the iFrame representing the ad inventory of the webpage
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requests from the ad server to display an ad (step 3). The ad server delivers the ad unit
from an ad network (step 4), and also report any ad metrics available so a payment can take
place. Each ad network has its own group of publishers, and it can also sell ad inventories
to an ad exchange (step 5). If an ad request cannot be fulfilled, it will be further relayed
to a Demand Side Platform provider (DSP) (step 6), and advertisers working with the DSP
can purchase the impression. The advantage of using a DSP is that advertisers will have
access to multiple ad exchanges. The advertisers can target users of a specific profile [44,
45], certain types of publishers, keywords [46], time of the day, flexible daily budget, etc.
The DSP, ad exchanges, and ad networks consolidates this information and shows the
optimal ad back to the publisher’s page (step 7 to 10). An impression is therefore fulfilled
and logged. Impressions are often charged according the CPM (Cost Per Mille, or cost
per thousand impression). If the ad is clicked, the ad server will log the click (step 11),
and redirect the user (step 12) to the page of the advertiser (step 13). In such an event,
the advertiser is charged by the click. The CPC (Cost Per Click) varies according to the
keywords of the webpage and the user category.
Publishers can syndicate the ads to other downstream publishers. In turn, the syndicated
publishers can subsyndicate the ads further to other publishers. Syndication enables the ads
to reach a wider audience. Thus, there can be several redirections among publishers before
ad request reaches ad server (step 3).
Omitted from Figure 2.1 are a number of quality control actors who interact with mul-
tiple phases of the impression flow. Such actors include ad verification companies (e.g., In-
tegral Ad Sciences), fraud detection companies (e.g., ForensIQ), demographic verification
companies (e.g., Nielsen), URL classification companies who provide context for topical
ad selection (e.g., Peer39), and ad blocking companies (e.g., Ghostery).
Entities in the ad ecosystem perform fraud detection independently. The technical de-
tails are not disclosed in public documents in order to avoid evasion by the fraudsters [47,
48, 49]. As a countermeasure for fraud, ad networks employ smart pricing to normalize
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CPC (Cost-Per-Click) based on distribution of conversion rates across all publishers [50,
48]. Different actions can be considered as conversion instead of a simple click or im-
pression, such as product news subscription, purchase activity, filling out a questionnaire,
etc. If traffic from a publisher results in a low conversion rate compared to other publish-
ers serving similar ads, the ad network may use smart pricing to reduce the CPC used to
calculate payment to that publisher. The drawback of the smart pricing policy is that ad-
vertisers have to share the conversion data with the ad networks. The conversion data are
often considered sentitive information and therefore advertisers typically are not willing to
share them. In practice, ad networks take many factors into account that would indicate the
probability for a conversion [51]. No details about these factors are revealed. Nevertheless,
since the conversion data are limited, attackers have been able to get payments based on
CPC even after smart pricing discounts [52].
While smart pricing could make fraudulent clicks less profitable, this is not the case
with fraudulent impressions. Only recently, Google and IAB announced the Ad “Viewa-
bility” standard in an effort to combat invalid impressions: at least 50% of ad pixels need
to be in view for a minimum of one second [4, 3]. Advertisers can now choose whether to
only bid on viewable impressions in the Real Time Bidding process [53]. However, it is
still a nontrivial problem to correctly measure viewability.
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL LOWER BOUNDS OF ONLINE ADVERTISING ABUSE
3.1 Motivation
Many researchers have observed a shift in how botnets are monetized [54], away from
traditional spam and bank fraud, towards advertising abuse [55]. Large botnets such as
Kelihos [56] and Asprox have moved to monetization methods that abuse the online ad
ecosystem. Unlike bank fraud and other types of abuse, impression and click fraud are
“low risk/high reward” for botmasters, given the inherent difficulty in ad abuse attribution
due to the complexity of the ad ecosystem [57].
To date, the evidence about the amount of ad-abuse attributed to modern botnets is
sporadic, mainly because of measurement challenges. Studying the monetization compo-
nents of botnets in a controlled environment (e.g., honeypots, dynamic malware analysis)
requires researchers to actively engage in the abuse, which poses ethical challenges. In
addition, dynamic malware analysis methods often fall short as botnets move their mon-
etization components away from binaries [58, 52], and instead deliver them as separate,
non-executable add-on modules. Such drawbacks point to the need for an efficient passive
analysis system that can analyze the long-term monetization campaign separately from the
traditional infection, Command and Control (C&C) and malware update methods.
To enable efficient, independent and passive analysis of the long-term ad-abuse caused
by botnets, we introduce a novel Ad-abuse Analysis System (A2S). A2S leverages spectral
clustering methods on passive DNS datasets to identify the network infrastructure (domain
names and IP addresses) the botnet under inspection uses to perform ad-abuse. It also em-
ploys sinkhole datasets to estimate lower bounds of financial loss caused by the fraudulent
impressions generated by the botnet.
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Using four years of long-term network datasets, A2S helped us estimate the scale of
the ad-abuse potentially inflicted on advertisers from one of the most notorious botnets
in history — TDSS/TDL4. Our conservative estimation shows that TDSS/TDL4 caused
financial damage of at least $346 million in total; roughly $340 thousand per day. Further-
more, this estimate only includes less than 15% of the botnet’s population, which suggests
that the overall financial loss of advertisers caused by all bots is likely higher.
While these numbers may appear large, they remain an underestimation of the overall
abuse due to the choices in our measurement methodology. We must emphasize that at
every step of our analysis, we err on the side of being overly conservative, as we are inter-
ested in lower bounds. This helps us establish as conservative of a lower bound as possible,
using aggressive, empirically driven filtering and relying on the lowest possible estimates
for constants used in our financial abuse calculation. We intentionally exclude highly likely
TDSS/TDL4 domains in exchange for a safer lower bound estimate.
We start by describing the necessary background information in Section 3.2. Next, we
describe the details of our Ad-abuse Analysis System in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we de-
scribe the datasets used to evaluate the ad-abuse component of the TDSS/TDL4 botnet. We
present the analysis of the botnet in Section 3.5, and two ad-abuse reports in Section 3.6.
We discuss ground truth and accuracy of the analysis in Section 3.7. Related work are dis-
cussed in Section 3.8. We conclude with Section 3.9 and the takeaways from this Chapter.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Botnets and Sinkholes
In the Domain Name System (DNS) [59, 60], domain names are composed of labels, sep-
arated by periods, which correspond to namespaces in a hierarchical tree structure. Each
label is a node, and the root label (.) is root of the tree. The hierarchical concatenation of
nodes creates a fully qualified domain name. A zone is a collection of nodes that constitute

























Figure 3.1: A high level overview of DNS resolution (1-8), the sinkholing processes (A)
and the points where ad-abuse can be observed (B and C).
a typical resolution process. It begins with a stub resolver issuing a domain name resolution
request for a domain, example.com, to the local recursive DNS server (RDNS) (see step
1, Figure 3.1). In the event that the RDNS does not have the resolution answer in its cache,
it will begin an iterative process to discover it. The RDNS will iteratively “walk” the DNS
hierarchy, starting from root server (steps 2 and 3), to the next level of effective top-level
domain (TLD) server (steps 4 and 5), and down to the authority name server (ANS) for
the requested zone (steps 6). Once the RDNS receives (step 7) the authoritative mapping
between the requested domain names and its corresponding answer (e.g., IP address) from
the authority, it forwards the answer back to the stub resolver (step 8).
After a command and control (C&C) domain for a botnet is resolved, the next step
is a connection attempt (e.g., HTTP GET) from the stub to the C&C server. Network
administrators and security researchers often take over such C&C domain names to change
their DNS setting, effectively making them point to a new location. This is commonly
known as “sinkholing” a domain name [61]. If example.com is sinkholed, the stub
resolver will establish any future C&C connections to the sinkhole (step 9, Figure 3.1)
rather than the adversary’s C&C server.
In addition to sinkholing a domain’s A/AAAA record, one can also sinkhole the ANS
that serves it. For instance, example.com can be sinkholed by changing the ANS record
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to a server under the control of the sinkholing party (e.g., law enforcement or security
researchers). Such an action would have the following result: during the DNS lookup chain
in Figure 3.1, after steps 1 to 5, the recursive DNS server will ask the new DNS sinkhole
server controlled by the sinkholing party about the authoritative answer for the domain
name. Sinkholing both the domain name and the ANS server is a common practice in the
security community as it provides telemetry from both the DNS resolution and network
communication planes of the threat being sinkholed.
Attackers often change C&C domains to avoid sinkholing. Domain name generation
algorithms (DGAs) [62, 52] can be used to rapidly update the C&C domains to remain agile
against sinkholing efforts. A DGA can be implemented client-side in the malware sample
itself, or server-side in the C&C server. Intuitively, client-side DGAs can be reverse engi-
neered from the malware sample. Unfortunately, server-side DGAs are much more difficult
to understand since the server computes and pushes new C&C domain configurations to the
bots. Reverse engineering requires obtaining the C&C server code, which is often heavily
protected by the author. However, monitoring traffic from infected hosts guarantees the
observation of C&C domain changes.
3.2.2 Observing Ad-abuse In Local Networks
To understand where and what a network administrator can monitor, we need to examine
the typical life cycle of an infected host. First, the malware looks up the IP address of the
C&C domain (point C in Figure 3.1). Second, it contacts the C&C server to get commands
for doing impression and click fraud (point A in Figure 3.1). Next, the malware attempts
to execute the commands by interacting with the ad ecosystem (point B in Figure 3.1).
Stealthy malware carries out these tasks by blending in with users’ normal web browsing
activities in order to evade anti-abuse detection within the ad ecosystem. Additionally,
the malware often reports back to the botmaster various byproducts from the monetization
activities (e.g., user’s search history) for bookkeeping of the monetization campaign.
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Typical egress monitoring functionality can be used to observe different aspects of ad-
abuse. Administrators can observe interaction between infected hosts and the Internet in-
frastructure that supports the monetization campaign (points A, C ), or between infected
hosts and the ad ecosystem (point B in Figure 3.1). From the network’s point of view, this
observation takes the form of DNS resolutions (i.e., for the domains facilitating ad-abuse
from point C in Figure 3.1) and any application-layer C&C communications between local
victims and the ad ecosystem (point B in Figure 3.1). We select observation points A and
C in Figure 3.1, so we can mine sinkhole and DNS datasets. Points A and C correspond to
the vantage point V1 in Figure 2.1, Section 2.2. We should also note that HTTP connections
can be observed for the sinkholed domain names (point A in Figure 3.1). The sinkholing
party did not return any commands to bots. Therefore, the communications to the sinkhole
did not, at any point, reach the ad ecosystem. This means that our efforts to study the bot-
net did not contribute any additional abuse to the advertisers and other parts of the online
advertising ecosystem.
3.3 Ad-abuse Analysis System
In this section we introduce the Ad-abuse Analysis System (A2S, Figure 3.2) that allows
administrators to systematically analyze ad-abuse in their networks. The goal of the system
is to provide a detailed analysis of the Internet infrastructure that supports ad-abuse mon-
etization. Such information helps administrators to independently (1) estimate the level of
ad-abuse that victims in the local networks contributed to the entire ad ecosystem and (2)
obtain a set of domain names and IPs that can be used for network policy actions. Network
administrators can take action against the monetization component of the botnet. If adver-
saries cannot monetize infected hosts in a network, the hosts in the network becomes less
appealing to compromise.
The system consists of three logical components: (i) the necessary datasets for its op-





















Ad-abuse Analysis System 
Figure 3.2: Overview of the Ad-abuse Analysis System (A2S).
DNS datasets, and (iii) a module to identify additional ad-abuse domains using passive
datasets. We begin by providing an overview of A2S.
3.3.1 System Overview
The first input of A2S is ground truth C&C domains obtained by either external threat
reports or manual analysis of a particular threat (Step (1), Figure 3.2). These reports are
added to our knowledge base, and act as input for two different modules: the DNS Ad-
abuse Rate Module (Step (2)) and the Spectral Expansion Module (Step (3)).
The DNS Ad-abuse Rate Module estimates how many ad-abuse events, i.e., C&C
connections requesting for impression or click fraud commands, are typically triggered
after a single DNS resolution request for any ad-abuse domain (Step (4)). This can be
achieved by “taking-over” a small portion of such ad-abuse C&C domain names for a
period of time. The takeover can be done by traditional sinkhole methods or commonly
used walled garden policy techniques [63] at the recursive DNS level and perimeter egress
points of a network.
The Spectral Expansion Module identifies a set of domain names that have been used
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by the ad-abuse campaign historically. We assume that infected hosts contact both known
and unknown ad-abuse domains and these domains share Internet infrastructure. We com-
bine ground truth from external threat intelligence with large passive DNS datasets (Step
(5)). The passive DNS datasets enable the creation of a graph between the bots in the local
network and the Internet infrastructure contacted by the bots. The graph is represented by
an association matrix. Spectral analysis of the association matrix enables us to extend the
ad-abuse domains to a larger set that is highly related to the ground truth. The module
iteratively expands the set of ad-abuse domains using sliding temporal windows and im-
proves our understanding of the long-term ad-abuse operation (Step (3)). After expansion,
the module sanitizes extended ad-abuse domains using historical WHOIS information to
eliminate false positives.
The resulting output from both modules will be combined (Step (6)) to derive the final
reports (Step (7)). The infrastructure report includes all domain names and IP addresses
used by the ad-abuse campaign. These domains and their historical DNS lookup volumes
are used to generate the financial abuse report. We use a financial model to approximate a
lower bound of advertisers’ loss caused by the campaign.
3.3.2 Datasets to Study Ad-abuse
Before we describe the two modules in A2S in detail, we need to explain the necessary
datasets required to analyze an ad-abuse campaign. These datasets include sinkholed traffic
from ad-abuse domain take-over actions and passive DNS datasets that contain historical
DNS resolutions for domain names observed in the local network.
Following a DNS query, the infected host will request commands from the C&C server.
For instance, the infected host could request a list of ads to view or click on, report user
content such as cookies and recent search terms, or even report fraudulent clicks and im-
pressions that took place. These communications between the infected host and the ad-
abuse C&C servers can be observed in the sinkhole datasets, which should include both the
21
DNS resolution requests for sinkholed domain names and all application layer (i.e., HTTP)
communication attempts towards the sinkhole infrastructure.
In addition to the sinkhole datasets, A2S needs passive DNS datasets. Specifically, the
datasets are recursive DNS query traffic (qDNS) from the hosts within the network and
traditional deduplicated passive DNS datasets (pDNS-DB) that record domain names and
their historical resolutions. A2S uses these datasets to identify ad-abuse C&C domains
from ground truth set D$ to a bigger set DA, which we will thoroughly explain in Sec-
tion 3.3.4.
Often, ad-abuse botnet modules use domain name generation algorithms (DGA) [62,
52] to facilitate the fraudulent activities. In such events, we can use DNS queries that result
in “non-existent domain” (a.k.a. NXDOMAINs) as the qDNS dataset since unknown C&C
domains may have never resolved. The use of DGAs is the most complicated case of ad-
abuse. TDSS/TDL4 uses a server-side DGA to facilitate ad-abuse.
3.3.3 DNS Ad-abuse Rate Module
The DNS Ad-abuse Rate module quantifies the number of ad-abuse events that are per-
formed after a single DNS request. In this case, the ad-abuse events are the C&C connec-
tions asking for impression or click fraud commands. This ad-abuse rate maps DNS lookup
volume to the number of total ad-abuse events. To properly compute the rate, the module
needs to analyze DNS queries and application-layer HTTP requests to sinkholed ad-abuse
domains.
We define the “DNS Ad-abuse Rate” as ζ = y/x, where x is the number of domain
name resolution requests for the sinkholed domains and y is the number of application-layer
communication attempts that reflect ad-abuse events. In other words, the module needs to
observe x domain name resolution requests and y HTTP connections to the sinkhole, within
a time window t, to safely assume a ζ level of ad-abuse happened with each historical ad-
abuse domain lookup. Administrators can collect such sinkhole datasets either by acquiring
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a commercial sinkhole data feed or by independently taking over the ad-abuse domains,
locally or globally.
Using ζ , the module can provide the system the ability to pivot from “short-term” sink-
hole observations to “long-term” passive DNS observations. Specifically, we can use the
DNS Ad-abuse Rate to analyze many years of DNS traffic related to the ad-abuse operation
using passive DNS datasets. We now discuss how A2S mines these datasets.
3.3.4 Spectral Expansion Module
The Spectral Expansion module uses local network traffic to reason about the domain
names used for the ad-abuse operation, over a long period of time. The module accurately
identifies additional domains based on original ground truth knowledge of the ad-abuse
operation, using a large passive DNS dataset. In other words, the spectral expansion mod-
ule is able to take a set of ground truth domains, D$, and eventually derive a larger set of
domains, DA, that have historically participated in the ad-abuse activities.
A2S derives DA using spectral clustering on DNS datasets from the local network. The
spectral expansion algorithm iterates through the entire DNS query dataset (qDNS). Each
iteration walks over DNS data for a given day, with the goal of discovering new ad-abuse
domains that will be added to the DA set.
We conservatively assume that unknown ad-abuse domains were queried by a common
group of infected hosts, or they pointed to the same Internet infrastructure that served the
known ad-abuse domains over the same temporal window. Each day, we create a tripar-
tite graph that “links” candidate domain names, their resolved IP addresses or Canonical
Names (CNAMEs), and the network hosts that queried for them. The association matrix
representing such a graph can be seen in Figure 3.3.
Spectral decomposition of this matrix enables this module to group candidate domain
names that either share common Internet infrastructure and/or local network hosts that
queried them, via standard clustering methods. Then we analyze the clusters to add domain
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Algorithm 1 Spectral Expansion Algorithm
Require:δ
1: H ← {h|∃q ∈ DA : h queried q on day di}
2: D ← {q|∃h ∈ H : h queried q on di}
3: Rdata ← {ip|∃q ∈ D : q resolved to ip historically} ∪ {cname|∃q ∈ D : q resolved
to cname historically}
4: Apply thresholds α and β to the sets of Rdata and H , respectively, to remove noisy
IPs and hosts.
5: M ← relationship between D and (Rdata, H). Normalize by IPs, CNAMEs and
Hosts.
6: S ←M ×MT
7: UΣV ∗ ← SV D(S)
8: clusters← XMeans(U)
9: DA ← Analyze clusters.
10: i = i+ δ, Go to line 1.
names to DA. Domains are added if they have explicit relationships with already known
ad-abuse Internet infrastructure or share common infected hosts.
Algorithm 1 formally describes the spectral expansion process. Each iteration of the
algorithm processes the DNS resolutions of day, di, to update the ad-abuse domain set, DA.
The operator can set δ to determine how the algorithm iterates through time.
Next we discuss the steps in detail for one iteration. Initially we assume that DA =
D$. The first four steps prepare necessary data for assumbling the association matrix for
domains of interest. In the first step, the algorithm identifies all internal network hosts (H)
querying any known ad-abuse domain in DA. In the second step, the algorithm narrows
down potential unknown ad-abuse domains to all domains (D) queried by infected hosts
(H). In the third step, we obtain all historical IP addresses and CNAMEs for domain
names in D from the local passive DNS database, denoted as Rdata.
During the fourth step, the algorithm removes any “noisy IP addresses” from Rdata
and “noisy hosts” from H . IP addresses that are likely used for parking or sinkholing
and hosts that are probably large gateways or part of security research infrastructure can
introduce noisy association between domains that do not reflect ad-abuse behavior (see
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Figure 3.3: Association matrix for domain, RDATA, and host.
thresholds. Note that aggressively removing noisy IP addresses and hosts reduces connec-
tions in the graph that could have led to more C&C domains, but results in safer estimation
that is still a lower-bound.
The first threshold (α) denotes the number of related historical domain names for an
IP address seen from network traffic on the local network. We exclude IPs with an unusu-
ally high number of domains. The second threshold (β) relates to the number of domains
queried by an infected host. In this case, if the number of domains queried by a host is
more than what’s typical for infected hosts in the local network, we exclude it from the
set H . The way we reason and select the actual values of α and β will be discussed in
Section 3.5.2.
In the fifth step, the algorithm builds an association matrix linking the domains in D
with the set of IP addresses and CNAMEs in Rdata and the set of internal hosts in H
that queried them. An example matrix is shown in Figure 3.3. The rows represent all
domains queried by infected hosts (q1...qm), and the columns reflect historically resolved
IPs/CNAMEs and the hosts that queried those domains in the day di. In order to assemble
the matrix we compute two types of weights.
The first weight represents the DNS lookup properties from the domains inRdata, with
respect to IPs and CNAMEs. Specifically, the weights wij and w
′
ij are the timestamps for
the first day (wij) and the last day (w
′
ij) we observed domain name qi resolving to IPj . In
the same sense, the weights wik and w
′
ik are the timestamps for the first and last day we
observed domain name qi resolving to CNAME CNk.
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The second weight represents a binary indicator of whether the particular domain name
in D was queried in day di by an internal host in H . Specifically, if host hostl queried
domain qi on day di, the weight value wil equals 1; otherwise, wil equals 0. After the
matrix has been assembled, the algorithm will normalize by row (for each qi) the sum of
“IP” values to one, the sum of “CNAME” values to one, and the sum of “Host” values to
one.
In step six the algorithm transforms the association matrix Mm×n to its corresponding
similarity matrix Sm×m. This matrix represents how similar domain name qi is to any other
domain qj . During the seventh step, the algorithm performs Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) on S, and obtains UΣV ∗ = SV D(S). The first twenty eigenvalues are kept for step
eight, where the twenty-dimensional eigenvectors are clustered by XMeans [64].
Step nine analyzes the resulting clusters and finds new ad-abuse domain names. This
cluster characterization process propagates the existing labels from ad-abuse domains in
our knowledge base to unknown domains. The label propagation rules are based on both
IP infrastructure overlap and querying host overlap between domains. We discuss how we
propagate these labels based on cluster specific thresholds in Section 3.5.2. The known
ad-abuse domain names set DA is updated with the newly discovered domains.
The tenth and final step of the algorithm restarts the algorithm from the first step.
Depending on the value δ set by the administrator, the algorithm determines the day to
check next; for δ = 1, the algorithm proceeds to the next day, whereas δ = −1 forces it
to go backwards in time. This is very useful when the original ground truth domains were
seen in the middle of the long-term network observations. Using the updated set DA, the
system can identify more ad-abuse domains. After reaching the last day of available data
according to the iterating direction specified by δ, the algorithm stops.
Finally, the module sanitizes the derived DA to exclude mistakenly characterized ad-
abuse domains based on historical WHOIS information. We extract email addresses and
name servers from WHOIS for each domain in DA, and compare these with known emails
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and name servers used for the ad-abuse domains in D$. If either email or name server
matches, the newly discovered domain is kept in DA. Otherwise, we exclude the domain
from financial analysis. Thus, the derived DA will be used to estimate conservative lower
bounds of ad-abuse in the local network.
3.3.5 Reports On Ad-abuse And Financial Models
Outputs from the DNS Ad-abuse Rate and Spectral Expansion Modules are combined with
further analysis of pDNS-DB to generate two reports. The first report describes the network
infrastructure used to facilitate the ad-abuse, using historical IP addresses derived from the
extended ad-abuse domains DA. These domains, along with the DNS Ad-abuse Rate and
the daily DNS lookup volumes, are used to generate the second report that estimates the
daily and overall financial impact of ad-abuse to the online advertising ecosystem.
To derive the financial model used to calculate the abuse M to the ad-ecosystem, we
first consider advertisers’ loss on both fraudulent clicks and impressions in the generic case








For each day i, advertisers’ loss is calculated based on the number of DNS requests
Ri to d ∈ DA observed in the local network. ζ ∗ Ri reflects the total number of ad-abuse
HTTP connections for C&C purposes. We separate the connections in ζ ∗ Ri into two
different components. The pclk component reflects the percentage of HTTP connections
for click fraud communications. The second component pim represents the remaining per-
centage of HTTP connections that corresponds to impression fraud communications. Since
each connection may contain multiple clicks or impressions, µclk and µim represents the
multiplicative factor for the model to derive the total number of clicks or impressions, re-
spectively. The number of clicks multiplied by the CPC (Cost Per Click) allows us to




























HTTP and DNS Sinkhole Connections Per Day
Figure 3.4: Number of requests received by the DNS and HTTP sinkholes over 10 months.
the CPM (cost-per-thousand impressions) allows us to calculate the financial loss from
the fraudulent impressions. Finally, the sum of financial loss from all days in the dataset is
the total loss that the advertisers endured due to the infections in the local network.
Equation (3.1) shows advertisers’ loss if no fraud was detected by entities in the ad
ecosystem. Since we want to derive the lower bound of advertisers’ loss, we assume that the
botnet under inspection did not profit from fraudulent clicks, due to smart pricing policies
(effectively setting CPC = $0). In addition, we assume that all impressions related ad-
abuse was successful, since the Ad “Viewability” standard has only recently seen some








We would like to emphasize that with model Mimpression we assume that smart pricing
policies were perfect across the entire ecosystem and no click fraud made profit at any
point in the lifetime of the botnet operation. The financial model Mimpression assumes
that the attackers were able to monetize fraudulent impressions from infected hosts. This
is a realistic assumption since detecting impression fraud has been extremely challenging
to date [65, 54]. We caution the reader that fraudulent clicks could still be successfully
monetized even after smart pricing normalization, although the CPC may be reduced to a
small percentage of the standard CPC [7]. To precisely estimate this percentage it would
require us to obtain data from several affected entities in the ad ecosystem over the lifetime
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Table 3.1: Summary of datasets.
Records
Date Range Size (millions)
DNS Sinkhole 8/1/2012 - 5/31/2013 6.9G 565
HTTP Sinkhole 8/1/2012 - 5/31/2013 248.6G 919
NXDOMAIN 6/27/2010 - 9/15/2014 133.5G 13,557
pDNS-DB 1/1/2011 - 11/6/2014 17.9T 10,209
of the botnet. Since we are interested in lower bounds, we decided to simply use the
conservative choice of Mimpression as the financial model that would help us generate the
ad-abuse financial report for the botnet.
3.4 Dataset Collection
In order to increase the situational awareness behind the problem of long-term ad abuse,
we decided to analyze the ad-abuse component of the TDSS/TDL4 botnet, one of the most
sophisticated, complex, and long-lived botnets in history. The ad-abuse component is agile
because it uses a server-side DGA to generate its C&C domains. As our “local network”
we selected one of the largest US Internet Service Providers (ISP). The ISP provided over
four years of historical network data, permitting testing of A2S on a large scale. Table 4.1
summarizes the datasets.
3.4.1 Sinkhole Datasets
We obtained sinkhole DNS and HTTP traces for the ad-abuse component of TDSS/TDL4
from two security companies. The goal of obtaining these datasets is to quantify the DNS
Ad-abuse Rate (Section 3.3.3). To do so, we need to understand the type of HTTP connec-
tions in the datasets.
The datasets span over 10 months, during which the Authoritative Name Server (ANS)
and the application-layer (HTTP) sinkhole points experienced some sporadic data loss due
to collection problems and outages. We should note that all domain names that were sink-
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holed had a zero time-to-live (TTL) value, which prevented caching at the recursive DNS
server level, forcing it to contact the DNS sinkhole server for every lookup. Moreover, the
HTTP sinkhole returned “HTTP 200 OK” answers back to the victims with no content.
That is, the sinkhole administrator did not actively engage in ad-abuse.
Figure 3.4 shows the number of requests received by the DNS and HTTP sinkholes
over 10 months. The downward spikes indicate data loss events. In the first two months,
the volume of HTTP requests is lower than that of DNS resolutions, which we suspect
is due to data collection issues. Starting from the middle of October, the HTTP requests
out-numbered the DNS resolutions, as expected.
TDSS/TDL4 uses two C&C protocols for its ad-abuse operation. Both protocols were
present in the HTTP datasets we obtained. The first protocol, “Protocol 1”, is the primary
mechanism through which the botnet performs impression fraud. This is achieved via an
HTTP GET request to the active C&C, which will reply back with a set of advertisement
URLs used for impression fraud. Among other information, Protocol 1 also reports the
version of the malware and a unique identifier for each victim, namely bid. All these ob-
servations are in-line with data collected and analyzed by other security researchers [66,
67]. The second protocol, “Protocol 2”, is used to report back information including search
terms from the victim’s browser, the publisher’s website where ads have been replaced
and clicked on, and the original ad that was replaced from the publisher’s website. A se-
mantically similar behavior of TDSS/TDL4 botnet is identified by Vacha et al. [68], where
fraudulent clicks were only generated when a user engaged in real clicks. In order to pro-
tect infected users’ privacy, the search terms were given to us in an aggregated form such
that they cannot be mapped to the individual ID and the infected IP.
In total, we observed 565 million unique DNS resolution requests. 544 million requests
were Protocol 1 and 21 million were Protocol 2 connections. This traffic was produced
by 47,525 different recursive DNS servers (RDNS) around the world. Hosts with 66,669
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Figure 3.5: Sensor availability for the NXDOMAIN dataset over four years. 247 out of
1,542 days are missing.
They made 343 million unique HTTP GET requests using properly formatted base64 en-
coded URLs. 919 million connections were recorded, only 0.87% of which were Protocol
2 communication, while the rest 99.13% were Protocol 1 connections. Thus, we assigned
pim = 99.13% for Equation (3.2).
3.4.2 Passive DNS Datasets
We gathered two types of DNS datasets from a large US ISP that represents approximately
30% of DNS traffic in the US. The first is the NXDOMAIN dataset, which covers over four
years of DNS queries from clients of the ISP for domains that did not resolve at the time of
query. The second dataset we obtained is a historical passive DNS database (pDNS-DB),
from the same ISP, containing DNS resource records (RR) [59, 60] collected from 1/1/2011
to 11/5/2014.
The NXDOMAIN dataset was collected below the recursive DNS servers, capturing
queries from hosts to the recursive DNS servers that result in DNS answers with a return
code of “NXDOMAIN”. Throughout the four-year period, we gained access to 1,295 days
of NXDOMAIN data (qDNS) from the ISP sensors (Figure 3.5).
The pDNS-DB dataset contains over 10 billion RRs. Each RR provides resolved data
and the daily lookup volume of a queried domain name. The pDNS-DB was collected from
24 geographically diverse ISP collection points in the United States.
31
Figure 3.6: Top: The line plot shows victim population of the botnet sample that contacted
the sinkhole infrastructure, with y-axis on the left. The area plot shows the number of
sinkholed domains with y-axis on the right. Bottom: Percent change.
3.5 Analysis and Measurements
In this section, we discuss how we compute the DNS Ad-abuse Rate, and how we propagate
ad-abuse domains from ground truth D$ to the larger set DA for TDSS/TDL4.
3.5.1 Computing the DNS Ad-abuse Rate
Since we did not operate the sinkholes, we need to make sure that the datasets we obtained
are generic enough and not biased before we can compute the DNS Ad-abuse Rate for the
TDSS/TDL4 botnet. Thus, we will first summarize the sinkhole datasets to make the DNS
Ad-abuse Rate reproducible by other researchers.
First, we need to understand the average lifetime of an infection using the unique in-
fection ID. Each connection to the HTTP sinkhole contained the victim’s IP address and
a unique victim identifier. This identifier was a 40-byte long hexadecimal value that was
tagged by TDSS/TDL4 malware as bid in Protocol 1 communications. Figure 3.7a shows
the cumulative distribution function of the average infection duration based on IP ad-
dress and victim ID. The results show a relatively longer infection lifetime for the victims
when we count them using the unique identifier than when we use the victim’s IP address.
Counting bots by IDs is more accurate than counting by IP addresses due to Network Ad-
dress Translation (NAT) points and DHCP churn rates, as other researchers have already
noted [69].
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Second, we want to examine whether the sinkhole traffic can cover a large victim popu-
lation, through which we can safely generalize the ad-abuse observation. The daily victim
population can be measured by the number of unique daily IDs that contacted the sinkhole.
Figure 3.6 illustrates how the number of daily victims changes over time and the percent-
age of change [70] for the botnet observed from the sinkhole data. In the first two months
of the datasets, the number of infected IDs reached a maximum of almost 30,000. After a
sudden 6.7% drop in October, the number of IDs seen daily in our datasets decreased, un-
til the middle of November 2012. The decrease indicates that the malware changed C&C
domains from sinkholed domains to others. At that point the sinkhole administrators “re-
freshed” the sinkhole by adding six new domain names for the same botnet. This caused an
increase in the number of IDs that were found in the sinkhole datasets. It is worth noting
that a large number of old IDs reappeared in the sinkhole data after the addition of these six
new domains. This observation is expected, as the server side DGA churns through new
domains and old infections catch up with the new sinkholed domain names. After a peak
of almost 8.9% increase at the end of 2012, the daily victim population remained around
23,000 until the middle of February 2013. Afterwards, the size decreased by a factor of
almost 2% daily.
Finally, we need to examine the geographic distribution of the infected population. As
our passive DNS datasets were collected at a US ISP, we want to make sure that the sink-
hole dataset contains a reasonable size of victims located in the US. We identified the corre-
sponding CIDR and Autonomous System Number (ASN) for each victim IP address [71],
and used historical data from Regional Internet Registries (RIR) to find the country codes
for the identified ASNs. Table 3.5a shows that almost half of the sinkhole traffic origi-
nates from victims in the US (46.77%). In total, 174 countries were affected, however,
only 15,802 infections resided in countries outside the top six. These results show that
TDSS/TDL4 traffic in our pDNS-DB dataset will allow us to study less than 15% of the
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Figure 3.7: 3.7a: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the infection duration based
on the infection ID and IP address. 3.7b: CDF for number of related historical domain
names per IP from initial ground truth (D$). 3.7c: CDF for the number of domains queried
by internal hosts (H). 3.7d: CDF for host overlaps for TDSS/TDL4 ground truth domains.
in the United States, which represents 30% of the overall DNS traffic in the US.
Computing the DNS Ad-abuse Rate ζ: Since our pDNS-DB dataset was obtained
from a US ISP, we calculated the DNS Ad-abuse Rate ζUSISP based on the sinkhole traf-
fic that reflected victims in the particular ISP. This resulted in 9,664 unique victim IDs,
28,779,830 DNS connections, 154,634,443 HTTP Protocol 1 connections and 1,159,027
HTTP Protocol 2 connections over an observation window of 10 months. Using this ISP-
specific dataset, we can compute the daily DNS Ad-abuse Rate and get the mean for the
entire ISP as ζUSISPmean = 27.62. We used ζ
USISP
mean = 27.62 as the final DNS Ad-abuse Rate
for our experiments. As discussed in Section 3.4.1, DNS caching will not bias our rate,
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since the sinkhole administrators set a TTL equal to zero for the domains they sinkholed.
3.5.2 Spectral Analysis
Utilizing both NXDOMAIN and pDNS-DB datasets, we identified additional ad-abuse do-
mains starting from our limited ground truth (D$) and ending up to a larger set (DA) that
supported the ad-abuse component of the TDSS/TDL4 botnet over four years. We derived
this new set of domainsDA by using Algorithm 1 described in Section 3.3.4. In this section
we discuss the operational challenges we faced while running this algorithm and how we
managed to ensure the accuracy of the derived set DA.
Assembling the Association Matrix
Algorithm 1 employs spectral clustering methods, which require a sparse association ma-
trix as input. A2S builds a matrix between domains we want to cluster as rows. As columns,
we combine all historical RDATA of the domains and the infected hosts that queried them.
Spectral clustering of such matrix results in clusters of domains that shared network infras-
tructure over the same time or were linked by infected host(s).
Before we constructed the association matrix (see Figure 3.3), we removed noisy IPs
and internal hosts from the sets Rdata and H based on the thresholds α and β. These
thresholds were chosen because they reflected extreme cases of IPs and internal hosts, with
respect to the local network.
Threshold (α) for Noisy IPs: Figure 3.7b shows the number of historical domain
names per IP address, which were manually labeled from the TDSS/TDL4 ad-abuse do-
mains in D$. Under 40% of confirmed TDSS/TDL4 C&C IPs historically have fewer than
1,000 domains pointing to them. Concurrently, over 50% of these IPs have more than
20,000 related historical domain names. Such IPs are likely used for parking or sinkholing
purposes. We manually analyzed the set of IP addresses with around 1,000 related histor-
ical domains to assess whether they are malicious. The analysis revealed that considering
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IPs with more than 1,000 historical domains as noisy is an aggressive threshold. However,
since we are estimating the lower-bound of TDSS/TDL4 ad-abuse operation, falsely remov-
ing IPs that were not used for parking or sinkholing will only help our lower bound goal.
That is, such aggressive threshold will only remove links within the association matrix that
would have allowed us to discover additional ad-abuse domains that could be added to the
set DA.
Threshold (β) for Noisy Hosts: Figure 3.7c shows the cumulative distribution of the
number of domains queried by infected hosts in a day. Note that the x-axis is in log scale
and the y-axis starts at 90%. The plot shows that only 0.7% of infected hosts queried more
than 1,000 domain names in a day. These hosts are likely gateways or research infrastruc-
ture that don’t necessarily associate known with unknown ad-abuse domains during the
clustering process. Thus, we used the 1,000 mark as a threshold. This means that any host
that queried more than 1,000 domains in a day was instantly excluded. Again, this is an
aggressive threshold, which rather forces us to underestimate the number of infected hosts
(and yield again to lower bounds).
Using these thresholds, we constructed the sparse matrix, performed Singular Value
Decomposition, and extracted the first 20 eigenvalues, which we used to cluster the domains
in the matrix using XMeans [64].
Cluster Analysis
After clustering, we labeled ad-abuse domains based on IP infrastructure and infected hosts.
IP infrastructure: From clusters containing known ad-abuse domains, we label other
unknown domains as ad-abuse domains if they share the same IP infrastructure. This pro-
vides a subset of all domains pointing to the IP infrastructure used by TDSS/TDL4, since
domains in these clusters have been queried by infected hosts and have resolved during the
same time frame as known ad-abuse domains.



























Dynamics of TDSS/TDL4 Domains and IP Infrastructure
Figure 3.8: Evolution of TDSS/TDL4 domains and their IP infrastructure. The number
of active domain names daily increased from 2010, and reached the maximum (333) on
4/9/2012. None of the domains resolved to any active IP after 10/15/2013.
domains can also be nonexistent domains that never resolve. Therefore, we cannot rely
solely on infrastructure to derive the set of domains DA. Although NXDOMAINs will
not be used to compute financial loss in Section 3.6.2, we would like to understand the
evolution of the botnet’s infrastructure. Our intuition is that, if a NXDOMAIN is queried by
a large percentage of known infected hosts, it is likely to be an ad-abuse domain. However,
in order to be more confident about this, we do not label it as ad-abuse domain unless there
is at least one other unknown NXDOMAIN sharing the same group of infected hosts.
We use an aggressive filtering process to find such domains based on internal host
overlaps. The internal host overlap is the percentage of the infected hosts that query any of
the domain names in a cluster. Multiple infected hosts may query the same NXDOMAIN
for reasons other than concurrent TDSS/TDL4 infections. To avoid misleading overlaps,
we examined ad-abuse domains in our ground truth to derive a cutoff for strongest overlap
signal. Figure 3.7d depicts the cumulative distribution of host overlaps for all ground truth
ad-abuse domains. It demonstrates a plateau in the top 5% of ad-abuse domains, which we
effectively use as a threshold to filter clusters and add new domains to the set DA. After
sorting the clusters with NXDOMAINs based on the host overlap, we keep the top 5%
clusters. We then apply the same technique to sort all the domains in these clusters and
keep the top 5% of all domains. This aggressive cutoff only keeps NXDOMAINs with the
strongest host overlaps, which is in line with our lower-bound goal.
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Correctness of Spectral Expansion Module
We bootstrapped the spectral expansion process with 296 TDSS/TDL4 domains gathered
from various public resources. After operating Algorithm 1 2,590 times, going over ev-
ery day of the NXDOMAIN dataset twice, we discovered 838 new TDSS/TDL4 domains.
This means that the total number of TDSS/TDL4 domain names in the set DA was 1,134.
Next, the sanitization process reduced DA to 765 domains based on historical WHOIS
(WHOWAS) information from DomainTools. These domains match known TDSS/TDL4
domain registration email addresses or name servers, as shown in Table 3.2. The reader
should note that the lookup volume for these domains will be used for the financial analy-
sis in Section 3.6.2.
Table 3.2: Categories of newly detected ad-abuse domains. There are only three non




email1@nhjhajsukk.cc 216 12 425
email2@aol.com 73 63 205
email3@dikloren.biz 65 9 144
email4@rocketmail.com 112 9 64
email5@kraniccky.com 6 3 57
email6@u7.eu 0 171 261
email7@gmx.com 0 20 28
Share TDSS Name Server 6 - 4
No Active IP Address
Sinkholed 64 9
Two TDSS Parking Services 25 -
Never Registered 268 -
Non TDSS/TDL4 3 -
Total 838 296
We manually analyzed the rest of the domains and found that only three domains were
mistakenly added to the set DA by the spectral expansion module, while the rest were
related to ad-abuse. The category “No Active IP Address” in Table 3.2 contains domains
that only resolved to known sinkholes, parking IPs, and domains that were never registered.
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“Sinkholed” represents domains sinkholed by researchers. “Two TDSS Parking Services”
refers to domains registered later in the four year time period, and pointed to the same two
parking services used by known TDSS domains during the same time. Lastly, 268 of newly
detected domains were never registered. However, based on the large host overlap of these
domains with known TDSS domains and name string characteristics, we concluded that
these domains were related to the TDSS/TDL4 botnet.
Overall, the spectral expansion Algorithm 1 was able to produce a high quality set of
TDSS/TDL4 domains (DA) while introducing a low number of non-TDSS/TDL4 domains
(3 out of 838 new domains). After removing these three domains, we used the remaining
1,131 to analyze ad-abuse C&C infrastructure. The 765 domains that survived the saniti-
zation process were used to analyze the financial impact to the ad ecosystem.
3.6 Ad-abuse Reports
This section discusses the two reports that summarize the network infrastructure properties
behind the ad-abuse component of TDSS/TDL4 and our estimation around financial impact
that the botnet brought to the advertisers over four years.
3.6.1 C&C Infrastructure
Using the 1,131 domains in set DA, we analyzed the network infrastructure used by the
ad-abuse component of the botnet. We separated IP addresses used by these domains into
parking, sinkhole, and active categories. Besides well-known parking and sinkholing IPs,
we consider IPs with more than 1,000 historical domains to be parking IPs because of the
α threshold discussed in Section 3.5.2. All other IP addresses were considered to be active.
Figure 3.8 shows the number of domains resolving into each category over the four year
observation period. In total, at least 863 domains were registered and the botnet used 228
IP addresses. These IP addresses were used for two years and ten months, until 10/15/2013.
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Figure 3.9: Ad-abuse C&C domains lifetime.
July 2012, a number of researchers started sinkholing some of the TDSS/TDL4 domains.
This perhaps forced the botmasters to change monetization tactics as security researchers
were investigating the ad-abuse component.
Half of the ad-abuse C&C domains resolved to different active IP addresses for more
than 90 days in total, as we can see from Figure 3.9a. Moreover, 20% of the C&C domains
were active for more than 240 days. The ad-abuse domains often switched status between
NXDOMAIN, pointing to active IPs, and being parked. The number of days between the
last and first active day of C&C domains is the period of time that they could be successfully
monetized, during which the botmasters should have received a sizable amount of traffic
volume from the victims. Figure 3.9b shows the cumulative distribution of time during
which the ad-abuse domains were monetized. The plot shows that 30% of domains were
monetized for more than six months, and 7% of domains were monetized for more than a
year.
The botnet used a variety of hosting infrastructures to facilitate the abuse. We obtained
ASN information [71] for 195 out of 228 total active IP addresses used by the ad-abuse
C&C. They are under 49 different Autonomous System Numbers (ASN), 59 CIDRs and
24 countries. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the servers around the globe, used by
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Table 3.3: The top 7 countries where C&C infrastructure has been identified. They count
towards 71% of the IP addresses.
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Figure 3.10: Top: Daily advertisers’ money loss caused by the ad-abuse component of
TDSS/TDL4. Bottom: Cumulative financial loss for advertisers. Less than 15% of the
botnet population is estimated to have been involved in ad fraud that cost at least $346
million from 1/1/2011 to 10/15/2013.
TDSS/TDL4 domains.
3.6.2 Financial Analysis
We used Equation (3.2) to estimate the advertisers’ financial loss. For our local network
(the US ISP) we calculated the DNS Ad-abuse Rate to be ζ = 27.62 (Section 3.5.1) and the
percentage for impression fraud as pim = 99.13% (Section 3.4.1). We used CPM = $2
according to a survey over twelve ad networks [72]. We calculated the daily number of
DNS requests Ri to domains used for ad-abuse that resolved to active IP addresses. We
should note that this is an under-estimation since we used aggressive thresholds to exclude
potentially parked domains in our passive DNS traces (as we discussed in Section 3.5.2).
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This resulted in 1.2 billion DNS requests in total. µim denotes the number of ads returned
by each Protocol 1 request (which relates to impression fraud activity). During our analysis,
we identified instances where as many as 50 ads were returned from the C&C after each
Protocol 1 request. We never saw fewer than 5 ads per request according to network traces
of malware execution reported by [66]. Therefore, we used µim = 5 for our lower bound
estimate.
Throughout the lifetime of TDSS/TDL4, we estimate levels of ad-abuse on the order
of at least $346 million using Equation (3.2). This lower bound is only based on the DNS
datasets from the ISP network we had access to. Figure 3.10 shows the distribution of the
financial loss caused by TDSS/TDL4 to advertisers. The daily financial loss is shown at
the top of the figure, and the cumulative financial loss is at the bottom. We observed 1,018
days of active ad-abuse C&C DNS communications, caused by victims in the US ISP. This
resulted in an average of $340 thousand daily financial loss for advertisers. However, before
the first sinkholed domain was registered on 7/11/2012, the daily estimate was on average
$616 thousand and peaked to $1.97 million on 1/7/2012. After the sinkholing action, the
financial impact to the advertisers drastically decreased as the plateau of the bottom plot in
Figure 3.10 shows.
We strongly believe that other networks in the world were affected by this threat based
on our sinkhole analysis described in Section 3.5.1. The victims in the entire ISP roughly
accounted for 30% of the total botnet population in the US. The infected hosts in the US
were less than 50% of the entire botnet population in the world. Thus, our lower bounds
may only conservatively estimate loss caused by less than 15% of the entire botnet popula-
tion.
Cost For Operating The TDSS/TDL4 Infrastructure: The ad-abuse hosting infras-
tructure was located in 228 different IPs. Without knowing the hosting plans actually used
by the botmasters, we have to consider an average cost plan for each service provider to
approximate the cost of running the TDSS/TDL4 botnet. Using manual analysis, we con-
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Table 3.4: Financial break down approximation among the entities of the online ad ecosys-





Ad Exchange (inbound) 8% 27.68
Ad Exchange (outbound) 8% 27.68
Ad Networks 32% 110.72
Ad Server/Publisher (Affiliates) 7% 24.22
clude that the average minimum (i.e., the botmaster is using the least expensive plan) cost
is approximately $33.62 per month, whereas the average maximum cost is almost $444
per month. We assume infrastructure is used around the clock. For IPs that we could not
link to a particular AS, we assume a flat rate. This rate corresponds to the median of the
observed prices around the world. Using this information, we conclude the cost to operate
the TDSS/TDL4 C&C infrastructure to be between $44,000 and $260,000 over four years.
Potential Financial Reward for the Botnet Operators/ Affiliates: While is impos-
sible to know for sure what the exact levels of their reward may have been, we will try to
approximate the revenue that went to the affiliate TDSS/TDL4 entities. To derive the stake-
holder and the break-down described in Table 3.4 we consulted a CTO of a large Demand
Service Platform (DSP) company, who wishes to remain anonymous. According to his ex-
pert opinion, these are the most typical breakdowns to various entities in the ad ecosystem.
As we can see from Table 3.4, the potential financial reward for the affiliates is in the order
of tens of millions of dollars.
It is logical to assume that the botmasters and affiliates are most likely getting paid as
publishers or traffic resellers. In this role, the estimated revenue is 7% of money spent by
advertisers, $24.22 million. The TDSS/TDL4 botnet may have a team of operators that
have previously harvested this immense amount of money from the ad-abuse operation.
Our estimates are in-line with investigations from law enforcement on the amount stolen
by fraudulent advertisement campaigns [5, 6]. For example, law enforcement agencies
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Table 3.5: The extent to which TDSS/TDL4 has affected the Internet. The tables are limited
to the top 6 observations. Ad networks and Publishers domain names have been aggregated









Other (168) 15,802 22.13
Total 71,374 100.00
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Other (83,854) 4,883 61.05
Total 7,997 100.00
(c) Publisher Websites Affected







Other (112,889) 6,197 77.57
Total 7,997 100.00
recently estimated a minimum level of financial gains on the order of $14 million for the
botmasters behind the DNSChanger botnet [73]. Note that DNSChanger was a significantly
smaller botnet that operated over less than half the time period that TDSS/TDL4 was active.
Ad Networks and Publishers Targeted
Although we did not use fraudulent clicks in our financial estimations, we use sinkhole
traffic from Protocol 2 to deteremine if the botnet was targeting a single or multiple entities
in the ad ecosystem. We studied the distribution of ad networks whose ads have been
replaced, according to the Protocol 2 traffic (Section 3.4.1). According to Table 3.5b, in
total, 83,860 different ad networks were targeted. Google Inc. ad networks account for
almost 17.3% (1.37 million instances) of the total ad-abuse observations. Facebook comes
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second, at 13.8% (1.1 million instances). Other ad networks share the remaining 68.9%.
The mean number of replaces ads was 95 and the median was four, reflecting a wide variety
of replacement behavior. Even excluding the most popular ad networks targeted, there is
still a long tail of 4,883 different ad networks constituting 61.05% of our observations. This
shows that botmasters did not target only one ad network but rather a variety of them.
Finally, Table 3.5c shows the number of times an ad shown on a publisher’s website
was replaced. The top publishers had approximately 2% to 5% of all malicious ad re-
placements. In total, 112,895 different publisher websites were affected by the victim’s
malware. Google again ranks high with an overall replacement frequency of almost 10%,
while their rival, Yahoo, was affected less than half as often. There is also a long tail of
112,889 different publishers.
3.7 Discussion
Our study aims to increase the situational awareness behind botnets that employ sophisti-
cated techniques to abuse the online ad ecosystem and hopefully motivate further research
in the space of ad-abuse. In this section we will discuss the most important challenges we
faced while analyzing TDSS/TDL4.
3.7.1 Ground Truth Behind The Financial Loss
The botnets that interact with and monetize the ad ecosystem typically do not target a single
entity (i.e., Google, Facebook, or Microsoft etc.). Due to the secrecy within the ecosystem,
it is very hard to gather all the datasets from different entities necessary to verify whether
the abuse levels we estimated are actually what the advertisers lost. For example, however
unlikely it may be, we cannot exclude the possibility that some percentage of the impres-
sion fraud could have been detected and stopped by some entities in the ad ecosystem.
Unfortunately, we cannot determine how much impression fraud, if any, was blocked, nor
by whom. Thus, we had to rely on our own assumptions to estimate the lower bound. How-
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ever, even in the scenario where one entity had perfect defenses, we cannot reliably assume
it to be true for all the other entities in the ad ecosystem. For instance, if one DSP lacks
proper defenses, fraud will still occur in the ad ecosystem. This means, that advertisers
using this DSP will pay a hefty price due to ad-abuse. While we contacted several entities
in the ad ecosystem, they remain secretive about the methodology and tools that they use
to detect fraud. Even if a small percentage (e.g., 30%) of the reported fraudulent traffic
evades detection, the losses are still significant.
3.7.2 Ground Truth Behind TDSS/TDL4
Our goal was to get ground truth around the way the TDSS/TDL4 botnet operates in the
wild without contributing to online abuse. To that extent, we decided to gather the ground
truth from external reports, and also from analyzing the sinkholing datasets of DGA do-
main names that supported the monetization module in TDSS/TDL4. Observation of DNS
Ad-abuse Rate was made passively from actual infected hosts around the world. The
TDSS/TDL4 victims were notified by a community effort behind this sinkholing opera-
tion, the sinkhole data were released to the operational community and several entities in
the online ad ecosystem from the moment the sinkhole operation began.
3.7.3 Smart Pricing Data For Impressions and Clicks
We used Equation (3.2) to compute the lower bound of financial loss of advertisers, which
assumes that perfect smart pricing for CPC was successfully used across the ad ecosystem,
and all fraudulent impressions impacted the advertisers.
We chose CPC = $0 to reflect on the lower bound for the financial analysis assuming
CPC smart pricing was perfect. The attackers most likely can still profit from fraudulent
clicks after smart pricing. For instance, recent work shows the actual CPC charged after
smart pricing was between 10 to 30 cents for ZeroAccess [7]. Smart pricing is hard since
not all conversion rates can be effectively measured. Not all conversion actions were logged
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and shared between advertisers and ad networks/exchanges. The fact that TDSS/TDL4
does both impression and click fraud implies that the monetization technique tried to avoid
detection by generating positive click-through rates.
We chose to account for all the impressions since impression fraud is still a hard prob-
lem to date. The new standard of Ad Viewability has been announced and deployed to
prevent advertisers from spending money on invalid ad impressions [4, 3]. However, since
there is almost no documentation about how impression fraud was handled by ad networks
and ad exchanges when TDSS/TDL4 was active (before October 2013), it is reasonable to
assume that a significant portion (if not all) of the impressions most likely went undetected.
As we have already pointed out, getting ground truth around this would require a collabo-
ration among many entities in the ecosystem. Such task was not realistically achievable by
the authors of this study.
3.8 Related Work
TDSS/TDL is a widely spread and intensively monetized malware family that has grown,
upgraded, and evolved into one of the most sophisticated rootkits over the years [74, 75,
76, 67]. The latest version (TDL4) varies significantly from its ancestor (TDL3), mainly
because it is no longer limited to 32-bit systems, but can also infect 64-bit systems. The ex-
tent to which the malware managed to propagate gave its operators the opportunity to move
to businesses other than ad-abuse, such as leasing the botnet and providing an installation
channel for new malware to the already infected systems.
Operating a sinkhole is a safe, passive way to collect data regarding network connec-
tions between malware and the servers they try to contact. Sinkholing works for network
connections that go over DNS. Malware needs to find a way to contact its Command and
Control (C&C) server [77], which cannot always be done through Peer to Peer (P2P) pro-
tocols, since network administrators often block them. Therefore, DNS is the preferred
channel for cheap communication. In the case of TDSS/TDL4, the malware uses P2P as
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an alternative communication method [78]. Data collected from a sinkhole operation can
be used to measure the network behavior of a botnet. For example, [69] used a similar
approach as the one described here to uniquely identify infected hosts.
There have been several studies of click fraud abuse, including many that measure
the abuse and propose counter measures. Such works often focus on the ad network’s
perspective [79, 68]. Springborn et al. [65] studied pay-per-view networks and described
how millions of dollars are lost by fraudulent impressions annually. This loss has also
been studied by Daswani et al. [80] through the “Clickbot.A” botnet of 100,000 hosts,
showing how the value chain of ad-abuse operates online. Moreover, Stone-Gross et al.
[54], studied abuse from both a botnet’s and ad network’s point of view, showing the large
amount of money the botnet can make. These works carefully focus on specific parts of the
ad ecosystem, while ours characterizes overall abuse impact by using edge-based metrics.
The work most similar to ours is the recent ZeroAccess study [7] that estimated daily
advertising losses caused by the botnet by analyzing just one week of click fraud activi-
ties during a takedown against the ad-abuse component of ZeroAccess. This was the first
study that analyzed the levels of ad-abuse behind ZeroAccess, mainly from the view of
a single ad network. While the ZeroAccess study was novel, it did not help large net-
work administrators independently measure the levels of ad-abuse originating from their
network environments and take appropriate actions. Studying the ad-abuse phenomenon
and deriving generalizable results cannot be achieved by using short temporal windows, or
examining the problem from the viewpoint of a single ad network. Our system addresses
these limitations from previous studies by studying the ad-abuse problem passively at the
edge of the Internet over a multi-year time period.
3.9 Summary
We present a novel Ad-abuse Analysis System (A2S) to conservatively estimate the long-
term damage the monetization component of botnets can cause to advertisers. We studied
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one of the most notorious botnets that monetized the ad ecosystem: TDSS/TDL4. Using a
long-term study of four years, taken from an edge-based system that permits generalization
to the overall ad ecosystem, we revealed the properties and evolution of the botnet’s in-
frastructure. We also estimated the lower bound for the abuse: less than 15% of the botnet
population inflicted financial loss to the advertisers of at least $346 million, observed via a
US ISP network over four years. This reveals the extent of the abuse that botnets bring to
the advertisers in the long term, making them the low risk and high reward monetization
method for modern botmasters. The estimated lower bound suggests the importance of
more research effort in the problem to detect and prevent it.
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CHAPTER 4
MEASURING NETWORK REPUTATION IN THE AD-BIDDING PROCESS
4.1 Motivation
In Chapter 3, we propose a new clustering technique to efficiently measure the impression
fraud from the botnet TDSS/TDL4. Similar to other past research efforts, the focus is
detecting ad abuse at the edge (i.e., the infected host), or, “outside” of the ad ecosystem.
This is vantage point V1 in Figure 2.1, Section 2.2. However, little is known about the
network policies that are being enforced within the ad ecosystem, especially during the
ad bidding process. Advertisers do not want to display ads on low quality publishers that
may include automated visits from adware and affiliate marketing entities, and thus they
need to selectively respond to ad bidding requests based on the reputation of the publishers.
Unfortunately, little work has been done to measure reputation of publisher domains.
In this Chapter, we examine if open source intelligence data from the security commu-
nity can be used to ascertain publisher reputation. To this end, we analyze anonymized ad
bidding requests between a large demand side platform (DSP) in North America and six
ad exchanges over a period of three months (vantage point V2 in Figure 2.1, Section 2.2).
Using open source intelligence from public blacklists and malware execution traces, we
investigate the reputation properties of publishers in the advertisement bidding process
(Section 4.5). This Chapter makes the following key observations:
• We explain the ad bidding process and measure it in detail to improve the network and
security communities’ understanding of the advertising ecosystem. These measure-
ments include bidding request traffic from six large ad exchanges for request volume,
publisher domains, and client distribution. We find that malicious publisher domains
tend to be present on more ad exchanges and reach more clients than non-blacklisted
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publisher domains on average. These differences are statistically significant and sug-
gest that reputation systems for advertisement publishers are possible.
• We identify that of all publisher domains seen in the DSP, 13,324 (0.27%) are on
blacklists, which generate only 1.8% of bid requests, and 134,262 (2.74%) are queried
by malware. This underestimates the amount of ad abuse based on other studies [23,
24], which has been measured as high as 30%. This also indicates that traditional
sources of maliciousness used in the security community are insufficient to under-
stand ad abuse seen from DSPs.
• Using graph analysis, we demonstrate how to track advertising infrastructure over
time. To focus on potentially malicious campaigns, we use a simple suspiciousness
heuristic based on open-source intelligence feeds. Using this technique, we identify
case studies that show ad network domains support Potentially Unwanted Programs
(PUP), rely on domain name generation algorithms, and are occasionally used to
distribute malware.
4.2 Real-Time Bidding
In this section, we briefly describe the real-time bidding process. Figure 4.1 shows a sim-
plified view of the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) process. The JavaScript from the publisher
page requests an ad through a bid request. In a request, the publisher includes information
such as category of the page, size of the ad space, country, user’s browser and OS version,
cookie, etc., and sends it to the ad exchange (step 1).
Once the ad exchange receives the bid request from a seller, it then consolidates the
request into seller site information (e.g., URL of the publisher page), device information,
and user data. The ad exchange sends the bid request to its buyer applications (step 2), for
instance, through a DSP.


















Figure 4.1: A simplified view of the Real-Time Bidding process.
Table 4.1: Summary of all datasets.
Date Range Size
DSP Traffic 12/10/2014 - 3/24/2015 2.61T
Public Blacklists 12/9/2009 - 1/15/2016 22G
Malware 1/1/2011 - 11/17/2015 136G
Alexa 12/10/2013 - 3/24/2015 10G
DNS 12/10/2014 - 3/24/2015 1.54T
URL and the markup price (step 3). The RTB protocol typically waits for a fixed amount
of time (e.g., 100ms) to collect bids, and then chooses the winning bid under the auction’s
rules (e.g., OpenRTB [81]). The ad exchange then notifies the winner and returns the ad to
the publisher (step 4).
In the aforementioned example, the bid request comes from the publisher directly.
Therefore, the publisher page is the referrer for the bid request. Very often, the bid re-
quest comes from the market place, where the original request was purchased and resold
by many intermediaries. In that case, the referrer is the last entity that sold the ad inventory
to the ad exchange. Ad exchanges do not have visibility of the user-side publisher if the
request comes from the market place. This is one of the challenges for ad exchanges to
detect and stop fraud.
4.3 Datasets
In this section, we describe the datasets we obtained including Demand Side Platform
















































Number of Bid Requests from Ad Exchanges
Figure 4.2: Number of daily bid requests from ad exchanges seen in the DSP.
a brief summary of the datasets.
4.3.1 DSP Traffic
The DSP provides ad bidding logs extracted from step 3 of Figure 4.1. The traffic is ag-
gregated into eight fields per hour every day: the ad exchange that issued the bid request,
the publisher domain name of the referrer URL, the hashed IP address of the user, the
country code and autonomous system number of the IP address, the hourly timestamp
of when the bid request was sent, and lastly the number of bid requests seen within the
specific hour that match all the previous fields. Within the fields, the publisher domain
name represents either the webpage that users saw, or the last traffic reseller before the bid
request reached the ad exchange. Next, we describe DSP traffic using the volume of bid
requests and publisher domain names.
Bid Request Volume
It is reasonable to assume that for each bid request, some advertiser wins the bid eventually.
Therefore, the bid request volume can be considered to be the number of ad inventories
purchased and shuffled through the ad exchanges from the visibility of the DSP.
Figure 4.2 shows the bid request volume from six different ad exchanges from 12/10/2014
to 3/24/2015. One of these ad exchanges is ranked top five in market share. On average,
there are 3.45 billion bid requests daily in total. Individually, Exchange A processed the




























































Number of Unique Domains Daily from Ad Exchanges
Figure 4.3: Number of daily publisher domains from ad exchanges seen in the DSP.
comes next, with an average of 695 million requests per day. In addition, Exchange E,
Exchange F, and Exchange C received bid requests on the order of hundreds of millions.
Finally, Exchange D had an average of 30 million bid requests daily, which fluctuated the
most compared to other ad exchanges.
Comparing the volume of the last day from the DSP traffic (3/24/2015) with that of the
first day (12/10/2014), there is a decline in the overall bid request volume from Exchange
A (63.2%), Exchange B (34.3%), Exchange C (83.2%), and Exchange D (31.2%). How-
ever, the volume increased for Exchange E (18.34%) and Exchange F (64.26%). Our DSP
confirmed that this was not a traffic collection problem but could not identify the root cause
of these changes.
Publisher Domains
The publisher domain field in the DSP traffic indicates the source of an ad request. It is
either the publisher website where the ad will be shown, or the reseller domain redirected
from some previous publisher.
An average of 391,430 total publisher domains were seen from all ad exchanges every
day. Figure 4.3 shows the number of unique publisher domains from each ad exchange.
Although Exchange A had the highest number of bid requests (Figure 4.2), it represented
the lowest number of unique domains (average: 955) per day. It is likely that many of them
are traffic resellers. For instance, coxdigitalsolutions.com is a subsidiary of Cox
specializing in buying and selling digital media. It is the most popular publisher domain
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in Exchange A, generating more than 20% of all bid requests. The small set of publisher
domains of Exchange A is quite stable. There were no new publishers in 39 days out of
three months, and an average of 91 new publisher domains on the other days. Exchange
D has the fewest bid requests and also had very few publisher domains, an average of
14,732 every day. If an ad exchange works with few publishers, it is easier to provision
them and block malicious traffic. On the other hand, it is harder to know the source of ad
inventories from reseller publishers, meaning detection may need to happen at the reseller’s
perspective.
Two ad exchanges saw the largest number of new publisher domains. Exchange E had
an average of 22,647 new publisher domains, while Exchange F had an average of 23,405
new publisher domains daily. Towards the end of March 2015 in Figure 4.3, there were as
many as 35,794 new domains from Exchange E and 56,151 new domains from Exchange F.
Both ad exchanges also increased the volume of bid requests during the same time period
in Figure 4.2. The churn rates of the publisher domain names in these two ad exchanges
were quite high. This presents a challenge for ad exchanges to track the reputation of new
publishers.
Lastly, Exchange B had a stable number of publisher domains every day, on the order
of 100,000. There was a decrease in the number of daily publisher domains seen from
Exchange C around the end of 2014, and then the number increased again, reaching the
150,000 mark towards the end of March 2015.
4.3.2 Other Datasets
In order to measure reputation in the DSP bid request traffic, we also obtained other datasets
that provide threat information, which includes public blacklists and dynamic malware
execution traffic. Both provide insight into known abuse in the ad exchanges. We crawled
seven public blacklists [82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88] daily from 12/9/2009 to 1/15/2016. In




















Figure 4.4: Examples of blacklisted publisher domains seen in the DSP traffic.
execution feeds are from one university [89] and two industry partners. The binaries were
each executed for five minutes in a controlled environment. We extracted date, malware
md5, and the domain names queried during the execution of the binaries. The feeds are
collected from 1/1/2011 to 11/17/2015. There are 77.29 million unique malware md5s,
querying a total of 14.3 million domain names. We use PBL to denote the public blacklists
dataset and Md5 to denote the malware domains dataset.
Lastly, we collected DNS resolution data every day from a passive DNS repository
in North America between 12/10/2014 to 3/24/2015. The dataset contains domain name,
query type, and resolved data every day for A, NS, CNAME, and AAAA query types. We
observed a daily average of 891 million unique mappings between domain names. On
average, the DNS resolution dataset matches 71.56% of all publisher domain names seen
in the DSP in the same day. Among the 28.55% publisher domains from DSP not seen in
passive DNS, the majority of them are long tail content sites. For example, unpopular blog
sites, user’s own fantasy sport pages, customized lists pages, etc. Long tail content can be
specific to certain users’ interests and not commonly accessed across different networks.
In full disclosure, this is perhaps the only not fully open source intelligence source we used
in our experiments. However, commercial passive DNS offerings are very simple to obtain
today [90]. We will use the resolution information to construct infrastructure graphs and
track them over time in Section 4.6.
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4.4 Fraudulent Publisher Domains
In this section we provide examples of blacklisted publisher domains that generated ad
bidding requests through the ad exchanges. These domains are from adware and affiliate
marketing programs.
4.4.1 Case 1: PUP
Blacklisted publisher domains can be generated by Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP)
such as browser hijacker and pop-up ads.
Figure 4.4 (1) shows domain names of pattern websearch.*.info that are used by
browser hijackers [91]. The adware forces the user to use a different search engine to steal
impressions that would have otherwise been delivered through typical search engines (e.g.,
Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc.). The adware hijacks user search queries and makes ad bidding
requests from these publisher domains to generate revenue.
Figure 4.4 (2) shows “update” domains used by pop-up ads. The adware shows pop-
up ads that masquerade as fake updaters for legitimate software, such as Windows, Flash,
and video players [92]. These publisher domains make ad bidding requests from pop-up
windows generated by the adware.
4.4.2 Case 2: Affiliate Marketing
Blacklisted publisher domains may represent affiliate marketing domains. These affiliate
domains request ads through ad exchanges on behalf of adware or malware. We manually
analyzed network traces from dynamic execution of malware md5s that contained domains
in Figure 4.4 (3). The malware uses fake referrers to send HTTP GET requests through
domains in Figure 4.4 (3). Then the requests go through a chain of redirections until finally
receiving an ad to generate revenue.
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4.5 Measurement
We first discuss client IP location distribution in DSP traffic in Section 4.5.2. Then, we
perform reputation analysis of publisher domains by correlating them with blacklists and
malware domains in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.1 Summary of Findings
In summary, we found that:
• There are 13,324 (0.27%) known malicious domains generating bid request traffic
through the ad exchanges in our datasets. On average, they generate 1.8% of overall
bid requests daily, much less than previously published values [23, 24]. However,
68.28% of blacklisted domains were identified by public blacklists before they ap-
peared in DSP traffic. This suggests traditional sources of maliciousness are valuable,
but insufficient to understand ad-abuse from the perspective of DSPs.
• On average, blacklisted publisher domains tend to use more ad exchanges (aver-
age: 1.85) and reach more clients (average: 5109.47) compared to non-blacklisted
domains (average ad exchanges: 1.43, average hashed client IP addresses: 568.78)
(Section 4.5.3). This suggests reputation systems for ad publishers are possible.
• Contrary to the observation of blacklisted publisher domains, malware domains use a
similar number of ad exchanges (average: 1.44), but are seen from more hashed client
IP addresses (average: 2310.75), compared to publisher domains never queried by
malware (average ad exchanges: 1.43, average hashed client IP addresses: 485.36).
(Section 4.5.3)
4.5.2 Client Analysis
We observed 436 million hashed client IPs that sent bid requests for ads. According to
information provided by the DSP, the hashed client IP addresses are from 37,865 different
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Figure 4.5: Distributions of client IP address locations.
Table 4.2: 4.2a: The top six countries for 66.75% of hashed client IP addresses. 4.2b: The

























Autonomous Systems in 234 different countries.
Table 4.2a shows the top six countries where hashed client IP addresses reside. Nearly
40% of clients are located in the United States. Next, it is the United Kingdom with 8% of
hashed IP addresses. The top six countries also include Germany (7.11%), Canada (4.82%),
France (3.90%), and Mexico (2.98%). There is a long tail of 228 other countries for the
remaining clients. Overall the top six countries account for 66.75% of all the hashed client
IP addresses seen in DSP. Figure 4.5 shows the country distribution of hashed client IP
address locations.
Table 4.2b presents the top six Autonomous System Names (ASNs) for hashed client
IP addresses. The ASN distribution is less biased compared to the country distribution.
Comcast, AT&T, and Deutsche Telekom are the top three ASNs, each with under 5% of all
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hashed IP addresses. There are 37,859 different ASNs in the long tail of the distribution,
which contains 82.34% of all hashed IPs.
4.5.3 Reputation Analysis
In this section, we explain how we intersect publisher domains from DSP traffic with black-
lists and malware domains to perform reputation analysis.
Public Blacklist Traffic
Since 89.87% of the domains on the blacklists we collected do not have semantic informa-
tion, we filter them to ensure they are bad publishers with high confidence. We want to be
conservative about what we keep, so we choose the following filters. First, we obtained
all the domains that appeared on the Alexa [93] top one million list for every day from
12/10/2014 to 3/24/2015. We excluded those consistent Alexa domains because they are
unlikely to be malicious. Second, we excluded all domains under the ad server category of
EasyList [94], because malware conducting impression fraud or click fraud can generate
traffic that goes through ad servers. Lastly, we excluded a hand curated a whitelist of CDN
effective second level domains (e2lds) and we excluded all fully qualified domain names
that overlapped with these e2lds.
Observation 1: 0.27% publisher domains appeared in DSP traffic were blacklisted
by the security community. They generated 1.8% of all bid requests daily.
We observed 4,905,224 unique domains in the DSP traffic from 12/10/2014 to 3/24/2014.
Among them, 13,324 (0.27%) domains were blacklisted some time between 12/9/2009 and
1/15/2016. Blacklisted domains were responsible for an average of 1.8% of all bid requests
every day. Previous studies estimate nearly 30% of bid requests are malicious [23, 24],
which suggests this is only a fraction of the actual abuse. While there are many potential
causes, such as referrer spoofing or lack of ad-abuse investigations, these findings show























(b) Last seen dates
Figure 4.6: Density plot of first seen date date on PBL - first date seen from DSP (4.6a) and
last seen date on PBL - last date seen from DSP (4.6b).
bat abuse. While they are few, we investigated the potential to automatically detect these
abusive domains.
Observation 2: 68.28% of blacklisted publisher domains were known to the secu-
rity community before they appeared in DSP traffic.
Figure 4.6a shows the density distribution for the difference of days between when a
domain was first blacklisted and when it was seen in DSP traffic. The zero value in this
case means that the domain name was blacklisted on the same day as it was seen in the
ad exchanges. Similarly, a value of -500 means that the domain was blacklisted 500 days
before it ever appeared in the datasets from the DSP. The plot shows that 68.28% (9,097) of
all blacklist domains were known to the security community prior to they started requesting
for ads in the DSP traffic. Moreover, 32.49% (4,329) of blacklisted publisher domains were
labeled more than 535 days before they were seen in the DSP datasets. The peaks of the
distribution reflects several blacklists update events. One event was a major update of
4,031 domains on 6/23/2013, which corresponds to the -535 days in Figure 4.6a. Another
update event on 12/4/2014 was reflected around -6 days in the plot. Eighty domains were
blacklisted on 1/15/2011, which makes up the small bump around -1500 days in the plot.
Figure 4.7 is a scatter plot of the first date a domain is blacklisted (x-axis) and its
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Figure 4.7: Scatter plot of first date seen on PBL and first date seen from DSP for all DSP
domains that were on PBL.
number of domains in these dates. The points in the bottom side of the plot are large be-
cause this is the first date we had the DSP data. The vertical group of points represent
domains being updated in the blacklist in the same day. We highlighted a few days when
blacklisted domains from the DSP traffic were first labeled. The plot is more dense on
the right side since 2013-06-23. We increased the number of blacklists to crawl from 3
to 7 on that day, which resulted in more domain names in PBL dataset and more over-
lap with the DSP traffic from that point on. On 2013-11-17, the blacklists updated many
domain names including websearch.*.info used by browser hijackers. On 2015-02-
04, there were a lot of “update” domains used by pop-up ads added to the blacklists, e.g.,
soft12.onlineupdatenow.com. On 2015-06-14, the blacklists updated a group of
algorithmically generated domains with sub domains freempr#.
Observation 3: Most (77.01%) blacklisted publisher domains remained on black-
lists after they were last seen in DSP traffic.
We would like to see whether the publisher domains remained on the blacklists after
they were seen in the DSP. We plotted the density distribution for the number of days when
a domain was last seen on blacklists minus when it last appeared in the DSP (Figure 4.6b).
The distribution has shifted a lot towards the right part of the x-axis this time. Figure 4.6b
shows that the majority (77.01%) of blacklisted domains were still on blacklists after they
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were seen in the DSP. A total of 14.06% (1,873) of them remained on blacklists more than
a year after they were last seen in the DSP datasets. The peak of Figure 4.6b reflects the
last date (1/15/2016) of our blacklist dataset. Overall 8,051 DSP domains belong to this
peak in the plot.
Observation 4: Blacklisted publisher domains tend to use more ad exchanges and
reach more hashed client IP addresses than those that have never been blacklisted.
Each day, we separate the publisher domains into two groups: those that were seen in
PBL (True) and not in PBL (False). For each group, we compute the average number of
distinct ad exchanges and the number of hashed client IPs that a publisher domain was seen
from, as well as the variance within the group. We visualize the results in Figure 4.8a to
Figure 4.8d.
Figure 4.8a shows the density distributions of the daily average number of ad exchanges
for the PBL group and non-PBL group across the entire DSP dataset. The PBL group were
seen from an average of 1.7 to 2 ad exchanges, more than the non-PBL group. We per-
form a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) where the null hypothesis is that
x=y, i.e., that the datasets are drawn from the same distribution. The K-S test demonstrates
we can reject this null hypothesis (p − value < 2.22 ∗ 10−16). Therefore, the two distri-
butions are significantly different. We also plot the mean and variance of the average ad
exchange number for each group in Figure 4.8b. The figure shows that not only do non-
PBL domains use fewer ad exchanges in general, the difference of the measure between
non-PBL domains is small, as reflected by the variance. On the other hand, PBL domains
have relatively higher variance among themselves.
Similarly, we plot the density distribution for number of average hashed client IP ad-
dresses in a day for the PBL and non-PBL groups (Figure 4.8c), as well as the mean and
variance of the metric (Figure 4.8d). These figures show that PBL domains tend to be seen
from more hashed client IPs than non-PBL domains. Since the majority of the content on
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(i) Components of 12/10/2014
Figure 4.8: Figure 4.8a to Figure 4.8d are PBL plots. Figure 4.8e to Figure 4.8h are Md5





































(c) Ad campaign scores
Figure 4.9: Figure 4.8i to Figure 4.9c are three scores for components seen on 12/10/2014
(Figure 4.9a), number of components in ad campaigns (Figure 4.9b) and ad campaign
scores (Figure 4.9c).
domain in general, and the variance of number of clients is low (Figure 4.8d). In contrast,
PBL domains seen in the RTB process aim to make money, and thus spread to as many
hosts as possible.
Malware Traffic
Domains queried by malware are another type of threat information commonly used by the
security community. We filtered the malware domains using the same three methods as
in the PBL case. Within 4,905,224 unique domains from the DSP traffic, 134,262(2.74%)
were queried by malware samples collected over five years. There are ten times more
publisher domains queried by malware than from those on blacklists. Similarly, we can
separate the publisher domains into two groups: malware domain group (Md5 True) and
non-malware domain group (Md5 False). We computed the average daily number of ad
exchanges and hashed client IP addresses for each day in the DSP traffic.
Observation 5: Malware domains have different behavior than blacklisted do-
mains. That is, malware domains were observed to employ similar number of ad
exchanges to non-malware domains, however, with a higher number of hashed client
IP addresses.
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Figure 4.8e to Figure 4.8h show the measurement results. We observe bimodal distribu-
tions of malware vs. non-malware domains in Figure 4.8e and Figure 4.8g. Figure 4.8e and
Figure 4.8f show that publisher domains queried by malware tend to use a similar number
of ad exchanges. In addition, the distributions between malware domains and non-malware
domains overlapped much more than when we compared PBL group with non-PBL group.
Therefore, the number of ad exchanges is not a distinguishing attribute for the MD5 group.
On the other hand, DSP domains queried by malware were still seen from a larger group
of hashed client IP addresses, compared to the rest of domains never queried by malware.
Malware domains that interact with ad ecosystem are relatively more popular than non-
malware domains.
Malware query non-malicious domains for various reasons, and only a few of the do-
mains are fraudulent publishers. Recall that when malware interacts with the ad ecosystem
from the client side (Figure 2.1), there may be syndicated publishers, or benign ad servers
contacted by the malware, in order to reach ad exchanges. Despite our filtering efforts, it
is likely that there are still numerous benign domains in the malware domain set. Addi-
tionally, domains could remain on blacklists after they become inactive or parked, which
results in false positives when using blacklists. These findings all point to the need for
better ad-abuse ground truth datasets.
4.6 Infrastructure Tracking
In this section, we show that traditional DNS infrastructure features can be used to extend
the ground truth set, discover new ad abuse cases and track the threat evolution over time.
This can be used by any entity in the ad ecosystem with visibility of bidding requests to
track advertising campaign infrastructure—focusing on those that are likely to be malicious
in intent. While we acknowledge that the word “campaign” has an overloaded meaning,
we define it in the following way and only in the context of ad abuse: a campaign will be
defined as the set of domain names that can be linked together over time based on their IP
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infrastructure properties.
At a high level, we construct graphs of the relationship between the domain name of the
ad publisher and the infrastructure the domain name uses. By building and merging these
graphs over time, we can track the infrastructure and focus on those campaigns that may
be malicious, e.g., domains known to have been blacklisted, queried by malware, or have
never been seen before. We present case studies based on this process in Section 4.7.
4.6.1 Constructing Infrastructure Graphs
An infrastructure graph is an undirected graphG, defined by its set of vertices V and edges
E. A disconnected graph is made up of multiple components or subgraphs with no adja-
cent edges between them. These components correspond to advertising campaigns that are
tracked over time. Vertices in infrastructure graphs are domain names or the RDATA the
domain names resolve to. RDATA can be an IPv4/IPv6 address (A/AAAA), a canonical
name (CNAME), or a nameserver (NS). Two vertices are adjacent if and only if exactly one
is a domain name, and the domain name resolved to the RDATA of one of the aforemen-
tioned query types (A/AAAA/CNAME/NS) during time twhen the domain name appeared
as a publisher for a bid request.
A Demand Side Platform provider (DSP) can build infrastructure graphs by performing
the following steps. First, the DSP collects all publisher domain names Dp from the bid
requests seen on day t. Second, the DSP resolves all domain names d ∈ Dp, which results
in zero or more domain name and IP address tuples. More formally, resolving d will yield
[(d, rdata0), · · · , (d, rdataN)] if d resolves to N different IPs, CNAMEs, or NSes on day
t. Each of these tuples corresponds to an edge in our graph G. Finally, after G is built for
day t, G is decomposed into its connected components C, where each component c ∈ C
is ranked and tracked over time as a specific ad campaign. While we experimented with
more sophisticated community discovery or spectral methods, the benefits gained were
disproportional to the add-on complexity. Thus, we decided to select the simplest and most
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Number of Vertices, Edges, and Desnsity Value for the Daily Graph
Figure 4.10: Number of vertices, edges and density values for the graph every day.
straightforward way to mine the graph for campaigns.
Since the DSP bidding request traffic did not include DNS resolution information, we
chose to correlate that with the DNS dataset obtained from a passive DNS database from
a North American ISP (Table 4.1). By combining the DNS resolution seen in the same
day in the ISP with the publisher domains from the bidding request traffic, we were able
to construct daily infrastructure graphs. Next, we discuss how we analyze the produced
graphs.
Graph Analysis
We study the infrastructure graphs using some basic graph analysis metrics. Specifically,
we first analyze overall graph properties including vertices, edges and density measures.
Then, we examine the connected components of the graphs every day and over time. These
analytics help us understand the infrastructure of the publisher domains, and give us in-
sights about how to rank components based on how suspicious they are and track them
over time.
First, we discuss three properties of daily infrastructure graphs. Figure 4.10 shows three
statistics for graphs generated every day: number of vertices (V ), number of edges (E), and
the density measure. We use the following formula to compute the graph density D:
D =
2E
V (V − 1)
(4.1)
On average, there are 472 thousand vertices, and 883 thousand edges every day. The
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graphs are extremely sparse and the daily density is only 8.35 ∗ 10−6. In fact, the majority
of the edges only connect two vertices. There are 566,744 vertices on 12/10/2014, and
it dropped to 342,426 (by 39.58%) on 1/29/2015. Then the number of vertices slowly
increased to 727,501 on 3/24/2015. Since vertices include publisher domains and DNS
resolution data, the change in the number of vertices over time is largely consistent with
the observation of how the number of daily publisher domains changed (Figure 4.3). On
the other hand, the change in the number of edges per day is different. The number of daily
edges decreased since 2/17/2015, and dropped to the lowest number 542,945 on 2/21/2015,
before it jumped up to 1,203,202 on 3/5/2015. Through manual analysis, we concluded that
this was not caused by any single domain name. There were fewer resolved data per domain
in general in these days.
Second, we study properties of connected components in the infrastructure graphs. Fig-
ure 4.10 shows the number of connected components over time that were in the daily infras-
tructure graphs. On average, there are 127,513 connected components in a day. Figure 4.8i
demonstrates that the daily infrastructure graph is highly disconnected. The cumulative dis-
tribution for the size of the components in a day follows the Zipf’s law. For instance, CDF
in 12/10/2010 shows that 86% of connected components have only one publisher domain
in it. Fewer than 0.7% components have more than ten publisher domains.
4.6.2 Identifying Suspicious Components
The number of graph components based on the results from Section 4.6.1 can be hundreds
of thousands in a day (Figure 4.10), which is likely too many for manual analysis. However,
the measurement from Section 4.5 suggests we can prioritize components that are likely to
be interesting from a security perspective. We know publisher domain names differ in
behavior when they are known to appear on blacklists. Conversely the subset of malware
domains seen in DSP are very noisy, and thus it is not a good metric to use for prioritizing
components. We also hypothesize that never-before-seen domains deserve close scrutiny
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as they may represent infrastructure changing to avoid detection. The question remains if
these are indicative of true malicious behavior. To find out, we rank publisher components
by their domain names, specifically, if they are on blacklists, if the domains have never
been seen before and a combination of these two measures.
For each publisher component c ∈ C we compute two values βc and νc that correspond
to the proportion of domains in c that appear on blacklists, and are under brand new from
the perspective of the DSP, respectively. Intuitively, the first one indicates an association
with known malicious activity, and the last suggests the potential threat may have just
begun. Specifically, the way we compute each value of a component is smoothed.
βc =
# of blacklisted publisher domains− 1
Total # of publisher domains
(4.2)
νc =
# of brand new publisher domains− 1
Total # of publisher domains
(4.3)
We offset the numerator count by one based on results of the infrastructure graph analysis
from Section 4.6.1. Since the majority of components have only one publisher domain
name in it, they are isolated singletons and do not provide any information to other unla-
beled domains from infrastructure point of view. We prefer not to prioritize these singletons
among all components even if they are already blacklisted or brand new. Equation 4.2 and
Equation 4.3 give singleton components both zero values. Moreover, we judge whether a
domain name is “brand new” using the effective second-level domains (e2ld) according to
public suffix list [95]. An e2ld is the smallest registrable unit of a domain name and two
domains under an e2ld are likely operated by the same individual. Therefore, a new domain
under a new e2ld is more interesting to us.
After getting these two values βc and νc, we also compute the linear combination of
these: ιc = 12(βc + νc). Finally, we reversely sort the components in a day based on
the ιc score. Within a day, ιc can range between 0 and 1. A component with higher ιc
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will be prioritized over a component with lower ιc for inspection. Figure 4.9a presents
cumulative distributions of the proportion of pbl-related, never-before-seen domains and a
linear combination of the two for a day per component. A total of 98% of the components
have zero PBL score because they do not have any blacklisted domains, and 14% of the
components have a score for having new domains. The final component score combining
the two falls in between the two distributions.
4.6.3 Tracking Campaigns Over Time
Building infrastructure graphs for an individual day is useful, but tracking the ad campaigns
over time will yield more comprehensive coverage of ad campaigns, as well as advanced
warning of potentially malicious ones. First, if an ad campaign is determined to be ma-
licious, tracking them over time through small infrastructure changes will enable more
comprehensive blacklists to be built. Second, if a tracked ad campaign is known to be ma-
licious, newly added infrastructure can be more pro-actively blacklisted. Finally, tracking
infrastructure over time allows us to build ground truth to eventually model malicious and
benign advertising campaign infrastructure. In our future work we plan to experiment with
predicting fraudulent publishers.
To unify ad campaigns across multiple infrastructure graphs, we simply join ad cam-
paigns that share IP addresses, canonical names, and name servers that are the same. This
allows us to not only construct graphs within days, but also across time. We will show
that this simple tracking method works well in practice. While on average there are 127K
connected components every day, only 10K of them form new ad campaigns. A DSP can
choose to only go through top-ranked new components if there is limited time available for
threat analysts.
ιad is used to sort advertising campaigns to identify case studies. It is calculated by
adding up all the interesting scores of individual components ιc belonging to that cam-













































Figure 4.11: Publisher domain examples.
interesting scores and number of components in the campaigns. Figure 4.9c shows the
cumulative distribution of ad campaign scores. Also, Figure 4.9b shows the CDF of the
number of components in an ad campaign. Overall 99.99% ad campaigns have fewer than
1,000 components. The ad campaign with the largest number of components (2.2 million
in Figure 4.9b) has the highest ad campaign score. Domains in this campaign resolved to
several parking, and sinkholing IP addresses, as well as common names servers like Go-
Daddy. This is the reason that this noisy campaign is not representative of maliciousness
or freshness of the domains. Starting from the second ad campaign, the interesting score
indicate suspicious activities in the ad exchanges. We now describe the case studies this
measure uncovers in Section 4.7.
4.7 Case Studies
Among the campaigns with highest (top 0.1%) interesting scores, we found new cases in-
cluding Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP), algorithm generated domains and malware
sites.
4.7.1 Case 1: PUP
Among advertising campaigns with the highest interesting scores, one category of publisher
domains are generated by Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP). For example, domains in
Figure 4.11 (1) to (5).
A VirusTotal report [96] suggests a machine communicating with domain names in Fig-
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ure 4.11 (1) (ιad ranked the 3rd highest) is likely infected with a trojan known as LEMIR
or Win32.BKClient by the AV industry. The malware has many capabilities including
changing default search engines to generate revenue, disabling Windows AV, Firewall and
Security Center notifications, and can drop additional malicious binaries [97]. Similarly, ad
campaigns with 2nd and 4th highest ιad (Figure 4.11 (2) (3)) are generated by ad injections
of certain browser extension. Different malware families communicate with domains in
Figure 4.11 (3) including Win.Trojan.Symmi [98]. These publisher domains may not be
malicious, but they are strongly associated with monetization behavior of malware. These
are interesting cases as traditional malware are involved in an area where we would expect
to see only adware or “potentially unwanted programs.” This shows that malware uses ad-
vertising fraud to monetize infections and malware can also be identified from the vantage
point of a DSP.
In addition, several Pop-up Ads campaigns exhibit high level of agility similar to tra-
ditional malware. The ad campaign ranked 1, 184th (Figure 4.11 (4)) uses domain fluxing,
likely to avoid browser extension detection systems. In total, we observed more than 26,000
unique domain names from this campaign in three months of DSP traffic. Moreover, the
ad campaign in Figure 4.11 (5) not only uses domain fluxing, it also uses the Amazon EC2
cloud to further decrease the chance of detection. Each of these domains resolved into an
EC2 cloud domain representing a unique Virtual Machine (VM), when active. The VM
domains also change according to the domains that point to them. This shows that miscre-
ants are constantly employing fresh VMs to perform ad fraud. Since traditional detection
systems often use reputation of IP addresses of domains and URLs, using cloud machines
makes this campaign harder to be detected.
4.7.2 Case 2: Algorithm Generated Domains
Figure 4.12 (1) (2) shows two ad campaigns of algorithm generated domains we found in


































Figure 4.12: Malware site example.
domains were blacklisted, but a high percentage of brand new domains results in a high
score. A new group of domains appear everyday, pointing to the same IP address. These
publisher domains are suspicious. Although no open threat analysis evidence is available
to date, it is reasonable to assume that anything that changes so often must be trying to
evade a detection process. With infrastructure tracking, ad exchanges or DSP can keep a
close eye on such campaigns to proactively deal with potential ad abuse.
4.7.3 Case 3: Malware Site
Figure 4.12 (3) shows a group of malware site domains (ranked 1, 484th campaign) seen
from DSP traffic, none of which appeared on blacklists. A Virustotal report [99] shows that
the IP address these domains resolved to, had other similar domains pointing to it during the
week ending on 3/24/2015. Related URLs were detected as malware sites by several URL
scanners from the AV industry. This group uses domain fluxing with both the second level
domain zone, and the child labels. We saw other groups of domains tracked separately,
with similar domain name patterns, and short lifetime. However, they were not grouped
into one big campaign, because different groups were using different IP addresses. In other
words, this campaign uses both domain fluxing and IP address fluxing. Since we only used
exact the same IP address match to form a campaign, we will need other information to
further analyze campaigns like this.
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4.8 Related Work
Previous research has studied behavior of click bots [80, 100, 68]. The bots mimic human
behavior by generating fake search queries and adding jitters to click delay. More advanced
bots hijacked users’ original clicks and replaced the ads [68, 62, 7, 101]. The ZeroAccess
botnet cost advertisers $100, 000 per day [7] and the TDSS/TDL4 botnet cost advertisers
at least $346 million in total. Ad fraud detection work mainly focused on click fraud [102,
103, 104].
Impression fraud is harder to detect than click fraud. Springborn et al. [65] studied
pay-per-view networks that generated fraudulent impressions from invisible iFrames and
caused advertisers millions of dollars lost. Advertisers can purchase bluff ads to measure
ad abuse [68] and compare charged impressions with valid impressions. The adware and
ad injection problem has been systematically studied by static and dynamic analysis of
web browser extensions [105, 106, 107]. From within the ad ecosystem, Stone-Gross et
al. [54] used ad hoc methods to study specific attacks faced by ad exchanges, including
referrer spoofing and cookie replay attacks. Google also documented what they consider to
be invalid traffic in [47] but did not disclose the details of their traffic filters.
4.9 Summary
In this Chapter, we measured ad abuse from the perspective of a Demand Side Platform
(DSP). We found that traditional sources of low reputation, such as public blacklists and
malware traces, greatly underestimate ad-abuse, which highlight the need to build lists
catered towards ad-abuse. The good news, however, is malicious publishers that participate
in ad-abuse can likely be modeled at the DSP level based on their behavioral characteristics.
Finally, malicious campaigns can be tracked using graph analysis and simple heuristics,
allowing DSPs to track suspicious infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 5
PRACTICAL ATTACKS AGAINST GRAPH-BASED CLUSTERING
5.1 Motivation
Several studies have shown how security systems that employ machine learning techniques
can be attacked [8, 9, 11, 12, 13], decreasing their overall detection accuracy. This re-
duction in accuracy makes it possible for adversaries to evade detection, rendering defense
systems obsolete.
While graph based network detection systems are not immune to adversarial attack, the
community knows little about practical attacks that can be mounted against them. As these
network detectors face a range of adversaries (e.g., from script kiddies to nation states), it
is important to understand the adversary’s capabilities, resources, and knowledge, as well
as the cost they incur when evading the systems.
In this Chapter we present the first practical attempt to attack graph based modeling
techniques in the context of network security. Our goal is to devise generic attacks on
graphs and demonstrate their effectiveness against a real-world system, called Pleiades [25].
Pleiades is a network detection system that groups and models unsuccessful DNS resolu-
tions from malware that employ domain name generation algorithms (DGAs) for their com-
mand and control (C&C) communications. The system is split into two phases. First, an
unsupervised process detects new DGA families by clustering a graph of hosts and the do-
mains they query. Second, each newly detected cluster is classified based on the properties
of the generated domains.
To evade graph clustering approaches like Pleiades, we devise two novel attacks—
targeted noise injection and small community—against three commonly used graph clus-
tering or embedding techniques: i) community discovery, ii) singular value decomposition
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(SVD), and iii) node2vec. Using three different real world datasets (a US telecommunica-
tion dataset, a US university dataset and a threat feed) and after considering three classes of
adversaries (adversaries with minimal, moderate and perfect knowledge) we mount these
two new attacks against the graph modeling component of Pleiades. We show that even
an adversary with minimal knowledge, i.e., knowing only what is available in open source
intelligence feeds and on their infected hosts, can evade detection.
Beyond devising practical attacks, we demonstrate that the attacks are inexpensive for
adversaries. Fortunately, defenders are not without recourse, and detection systems’ pa-
rameters can be tuned to be more resistant to evasion. Based on these discoveries, we make
recommendations to improve Pleaides’ resilience.
This Chapter makes the following contributions:
Two Novel Attacks The targeted noise injection attack improves on prior work that ran-
domly injects noise; by targeting the injected vertices and edges to copy the graph structure
of the original signal, we force noise into the resulting clusters. Our small community at-
tack abuses the known property of small communities in graphs to subdivide and separate
clusters into one or more unrelated clusters.
Practical Attacks and Defenses While more knowledgeable attackers typically fare bet-
ter, we demonstrate that even minimal knowledge attackers can be effective: attackers with
no knowledge beyond their infections can render 84% of clusters too noisy to be useful,
and evade clustering at a rate of 75%. The above attacks can be performed at low cost to
the adversary by not appearing to be anomalous, nor losing much connectivity. Simple de-
fenses raise the attacker’s costs and force only 0.2% of clusters to be too noisy, and drop the
success rate to 25%. State of the art embeddings, such as node2vec, offer more adversarial
resistance than SVD, which is used in Pleiades.
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5.2 Related Work
Existing work in adversarial machine learning has focused on analyzing the resilience of
classifiers. Huang et al. [108] categorize attack influence as either causative or exploratory,
with the former polluting the training dataset and the latter evading the deployed system
by crafting adversarial samples. Following the terminology of Huang et al., our work
focuses on exploratory attacks that target the graph clustering component of Pleiades. We
assume that the clustering hyperparameters are selected with attack-free labels, and the
subsequent classifier is not polluted when they are trained. Contrary to other exploratory
attacks in literature, we face the challenge that the clustering features cannot be modified
or computed directly, and that attackers often have an incomplete view of the defender’s
data.
In order to compute optimal graph partitions or vertex embeddings, one needs to have
a global view of all objects on the graph. On the contrary, related work can compute
classification features directly from crafting adversarial samples. For example, features are
directly obtained from spam emails [8, 9], PDF files [10, 11, 12], phishing pages [11],
images [14, 15, 13, 16], network attack packets [17], and exploits [18, 109]. These security
applications classify an object based on features extracted from only that object and its
behavior. This makes the features of system classifiers more local, and enables evasion
techniques such as gradient descent directly in the feature space. We make the following
definition: a local feature can be computed from only one object; whereas a global feature
needs information from all objects being clustered or classified.
Since Pleiades uses global features, an adversary’s knowledge can affect the success of
attacks. For example, if the adversary has full access to the defender’s datasets, she can
reliably compute clustering features and is more equipped to evade than a less knowledge-
able attacker. Many researchers [110, 111] have shown that, even without access to the
training dataset, having knowledge about the features and an oracle to obtain some labels
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of objects is sufficient for an attacker to approximate the original classifier.
Biggio et al. [19, 20] are the first to study adversarial clustering. They propose a bridge
attack, which works by injecting a small number of adversarial samples to merge clusters.
The attackers have perfect knowledge in their assumption. We distinguish our work by i)
considering attackers with different knowledge levels, ii) evaluating how adversarial graph-
clustering in network security affects the whole system, and iii) quantifying the cost of
attacks. With respect to attack cost analysis, Lowd et al. [112] propose a linear cost function
as a weighted sum of feature value differences for crafting evasive adversarial samples.
Since we do not work directly in the feature space, we propose different costs for the
attacks we present in Section 5.3.
To summarize, our work is novel because we focus on adversarial clustering, which
deals with global features that cannot be directly changed. We also evaluate capabilities of
attackers with various knowledge levels, and quantify the costs associated with attacks.
5.3 Threat Model & Attacks
In this section, we describe our threat model and explain our attacks as modifications to a
graph G. In practice, the attacker changes the graph based on the underlying data that are
being clustered. For example, if the vertices in a graph are infected hosts and the domains
they query as in Pleiades, the graph representation can be altered by customized malware
that changes its regular querying behavior.
5.3.1 Notation
An undirected graph G is defined by its sets of vertices (or nodes) V and edges E, where
G = (V,E) and E = {(vi, vj) : if there exists an edge between vi and vj, vi ∈ V, vj ∈ V }.
An undirected bipartite graph is a special case where V can be divided into two disjoint sets
(U and V ) such that every edge connects at a vertex in U and one in V , represented as G =
(U, V,E). While the attacks apply in the general case, oftentimes bipartite graphs appear in
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security contexts: hosts (U ) query domains (V ), clients connect to servers, malware make
system calls, etc. Finally, a complete undirected bipartite graph is where every vertex in U
has an edge to every vertex in V .
G is an undirected graph that represents the underlying data a defender clusters. The
graph clustering subdivides G into clusters C0, . . . , Ck, where V = C0 ∪ . . . ∪ Ck. If the
graph clustering method is based on graph partitions, then each cluster Ci is a subgraph Gi,
and G = G0 ∪ . . . ∪ Gk. Often when applied, a defender seeks to cluster vertices either
in U or V of the bipartite graph, for example, cluster end hosts based on the domains they
resolve, or malware based on the system calls they make. An attacker controls an attacker
graph, G ⊂ G. The adversary uses the targeted noise injection and the small community
attacks described below to change G to G′, by adding or removing nodes and edges from
G.
These attacks violate the underlying basic assumptions of graph clustering techniques,
which either renders the clustered subgraph G′ to be useless to the defender or prevents G′
from being extracted from G intact (See Section 5.3.3).
5.3.2 Threat Model
Before describing attacker knowledge levels, we discuss knowledge that is available to all
attackers. We assume all attackers have at least one active infection, or G ⊂ G. The
attacker is capable of using any information that could be gathered from G to aid in their
attacks. We also assume that an attacker can evaluate clusters like a defender can, e.g.,
manual verification. When done with a classifier, an attacker has black-box access to it or
can construct a surrogate that approximates the accuracy and behavior of the real classifier
based on public data. This may seem extreme, but the plethora of open source intelligence
(OSINT) [113, 114, 115] data and MLaaS machine learning tools [116, 117, 118, 119,
120] make this realistic. Finally, an attacker has full knowledge of the features, machine
learning algorithms, and hyperparameters used in both the unsupervised and supervised
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phases of the system under attack, as these are often published [25, 121, 29, 30, 28, 122,
123]. Since clustering requires some graph beyond G, we must consider attackers with
various representations of the defender’s G. We evaluate three levels: minimal, moderate,
and perfect knowledge. The minimal level attacker only knows what is in their attack graph
G, but the perfect attacker possesses G. For example, a perfect adversary would have access
to the telecommunication network data used in Pleiades, which is only obtainable by the
most sophisticated and well resourced of adversaries.
Minimal Knowledge The minimal knowledge case represents the least sophisticated ad-
versary. In this case, only the attacker graph G is known, as well as any open source
intelligence (OSINT). For example, the attacker can use OSINT to select potential data to
inject as noise, or can coordinate activities between their vertices in G. In the Pleiades
example, an attacker with minimal knowledge can draw information from their infected
hosts.
Moderate Knowledge The moderate knowledge case represents an adversary with G̃,
an approximation of G. If attacking Pleiades, G̃ would be a host/domain graph from a
large enterprise or university in order to approximate the view that the defender has. This
allows the adversary to evaluate their attacks. The size of G̃ affects the evaluation from
the attacker’s perspective, which we will explore by randomly sampling subgraphs of G̃.
An attacker with moderate knowledge is similar to a sophisticated adversary with access
to large datasets through legitimate (i.e., commercial data offerings) or illegitimate (i.e.,
security compromises) means.
Perfect Knowledge Finally, the perfect knowledge case is for an adversary who has ob-
tained G from the defender. Given the full dataset and knowledge of the modeling process,
an adversary can completely reconstruct the clustering results of the defender to evaluate
the effectiveness of their attacks. Ideally, this data would be well guarded making this
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level of knowledge only realistic for the most sophisticated of attackers, e.g., nation-state
sponsored threats. Nevertheless, considering the damage that could be done by a perfect
knowledge attacker is important as a security evaluation, since it allows us to find potential
weaknesses in the graph clustering techniques.
5.3.3 Attacks
We present two novel attacks against graph clustering. The first, targeted noise injec-
tion, improves on random injections [124, 125] by emulating the legitimate signal’s graph
structure. The second, small community attack, exploits the known phenomenon of small
communities in graphs [42, 126]. Our attacks violate both the homophily and the struc-
tural equivalence assumptions used by graph clustering methods. That is, our attacks either
change what nodes are close together to violate homophily, or they change observations of
node neighborhoods so as to violate structural equivalence.
Identifying a successful attack depends on the system, which will be described in detail
in Section 5.4. Since we use Pleiades, we evaluate attacks by the impact on a subsequent
classification of the resulting adversarial clusters. However, this could be done purely at
the unsupervised level by manually evaluating the accuracy of the output clusters, or lever-
aging prior work in adversarial malware clustering [19] to measure global cluster quality
decrease. Next, we evaluate the cost incurred by the attacker. We analyze the costs by
measuring changes to their graph’s structure that would either flag them as anomalous or
damage connectivity between the graph’s vertices. In the descriptions below, an attacker’s
initial graph G is shown, and the alterations yield a modified graph, G′, that represents a
defender’s view of the attacker’s graph after the adversarial manipulation.
Targeted Noise Injection
Figure 5.1 illustrates two targeted noise injection attacks. Consider a bipartite attacker














Figure 5.1: Example of targeted noise injection attacks on a graph.
into G to generate G′. We inject noisy edges from nodes controlled by the attacker for the
purpose of mirroring real edges. This encourages newly connected nodes to be clustered
together with the attacker’s nodes.
To inject noise, the attacker creates an additional vertex set V ′, represented by red
squares. Entities in V ′ should differ substantially from those in V , which depend on the
underlying system to be evaded. In Pleiades’ case, this means the injected domains (V ′)
must be different, in terms of character distribution, from the legitimate domains (V ). Then,
for every edge between U and V , the attacker creates a corresponding edge between U and
V ′, as shown in Figure 5.1. That is, the attack function f : (u, v) ∈ E 7→ (u, v′) ∈ E ′ is
bijective. This creates G′ = (U, V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E ′), where E ′ are the corresponding edges
from U to V ′, denoted by dotted red edges in the figure. The other way to inject noise is
to create edges from U to existing nodes from G, as shown in Figure 5.1. This does not
add additional nodes, but identifies other vertices on the defender’s graph G to use as V ′.
A new edge is created for all edges between U and V . Attacker information is used to
identify additional nodes to use. Example nodes may include other non-malicious domains
queried by infected hosts, or a machine’s existing behavior observed by the malware. More
commonly, it requires some knowledge of the graph being clustered, G. This process can
be repeated to increase |V ′| to be multiples of |V |.
Algorithm 2 formally describes noise injection for attacker A controlling the attacker
graph G, with noise level m. Line 1 to Line 6 repeats the noise injection process m times.
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Algorithm 2 Targeted Noise Injection Attack Algorithm for Attacker A controlling G
Input: A,m,G = (U, V,E)
Output: G′
1: for i = 1 to m do
2: V ′i ← according to knowledge of A
3: for v′ ∈ V ′i do
4: Mirror the edges such that f : (u, v) ∈ E 7→ (u, v′) ∈ E ′i is bijective.
5: end for
6: end for
7: Return G′ = (U, (
m⋃
i=1
V ′i ) ∪ V, (
m⋃
i=1
E ′i) ∪ E)
In line 2,A generates the set of noisy nodes V ′ according to her knowledge. From line 3 to
5, the attacker creates a one-to-one mapping from E to E ′i. Line 8 returns the manipulated
attacker graph G′ = (U, (
m⋃
i=1
V ′i ) ∪ V, (
m⋃
i=1
E ′i) ∪ E). We will evaluate two variants to
determine how much noise is needed to mount a successful, but low cost attack. In the first
variant m = 1, and in the second m = 2.
While additional edges and nodes could be injected arbitrarily at random, we choose
to mirror real edges in order to make both nodes from V ′ and V have similar embeddings.
We define V ′ to be the set of noisy nodes. The targeted noise injection attack exploits
the homophily assumption [38, 33] of graph clustering methods. In community discovery
and spectral methods, graph partitions cannot distinguish injected noisy nodes (V ′) from
real nodes (V ), which exhibit structurally identical connections to U . The co-occurrence
increases the observation of noisy nodes appearing in neighborhoods of real nodes, and
vice versa for node2vec. We expect nodes from V ′ to join existing clusters containing V .
The targeted noise injection attack has a cost for the attacker of raising the profile of
nodes belonging to attacker graph G, potentially making them outliers. Specifically, hosts
from U will increase in percentile with respect to their degree, i.e., a relatively high degree
could indicate anomalous behavior, which we can measure by the increase in percentile
ranking changes before and after an attack. We call this the anomaly cost.
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For attacking Pleiades, consider a graph where U are infected hosts and V are the
domain names that the hosts in U query. To generate G′ an attacker instructs their malware
to query an additional domain (v ∈ V ′) for each domain used for its normal malicious
operation (v ∈ V ). This causes the domains from V and V ′ to conflict such that the
clustering is not useful to the defender. However, the anomaly cost may make these trivial
to detect. Nonetheless, we will show in Section 5.5.2 that the cost of attack is small enough
to be practical.
Small Community
Figure 5.2 illustrates four potential small community attacks of increasing intensity. The
small community attack removes edges and/or nodes such that the graph clustering sepa-
rates a single attack graph into multiple clusters, while maintaining as much connectivity
from the original graph as possible. Again, G is a bipartite attacker graph with identical
vertex and edge sets as before. To mount the attack, an adversary first constructs a complete
version of G, Ĝ. In Ĝ, every vertex in U has an edge to every vertex in V . To construct
G′, the adversary removes edges from Ĝ. In Figure 5.2, the attacker has removed one and
two edges per vertex in V in G′1 and G
′




4, the attacker has
removed a vertex from V , and then removed one and two edges per remaining vertex. The
attacker randomly chooses nv (such that 0 ≤ nv ≤ |V | − 1) nodes to remove, and ne (such
that 0 ≤ ne ≤ |U | − 1) edges from each remaining node V in Ĝ. In the extreme case,
there is only one vertex remaining from V connecting to one in U , which often cannot be
captured by graph embeddings. Each attack instance is configured with (nv, ne) pair, or, in
other words, the (|V | − nv, |U | − ne) pair to keep nodes and edges. We define the attack
success rate as the number of successful attack configurations divided by |U | ∗ |V |.
If the attacker has minimal knowledge, she can choose nv and ne randomly, and hope
for the best. With perfect knowledge (knows G), she can choose the smallest nv and ne





















Figure 5.2: Example small community attacks on a graph.
Algorithm 3 Small Community Attack Algorithm for Attacker A controlling G
Input: A, G = (U, V,E)
Output: G′
1: Construct Ĝ = (U, V, Ê) from G, where |Ê| = |U | ∗ |V |
2: nv, ne ← according to knowledge of A, where nv < |V |, ne < |U |
3: V ′ ← Choose |V | − nv random nodes from V
4: for v′ ∈ V ′ do
5: Choose |U | − ne random edges that connect to v′ to update U ′ and E ′
6: end for
7: Return G′ = (U ′, V ′, E ′)
verify if their attacks succeed. WhileG could be manipulated directly, removing nodes and
edges lowers the utility for the attacker by losing connectivity in their attack graph. We
aim to reduce the average edge number per node of V in G, while simultaneously maintain
the lowest possible cost. Constructing and altering Ĝ both simplifies the experiments of
quantifying the small community attack cost and makes the job of the attacker easier. We
believe this does not negate the correctness of our experiments.
Algorithm 3 formally shows the the small community attack A in control of graph G.
Line 1 constructs the complete graph Ĝ from G. In line 2, A chooses (nv, ne) according
86
to her knowledge. Then, the attacker chooses |V | − nv random nodes from V as V ′. Each
node in V ′ connects to all nodes in U . From line 4 to 6, the attacker chooses |U | − ne
random edges to keep for each node in V ′, and thus forming U ′ and E ′. Lastly, line 7
returns G′ = (U ′, V ′, E ′) as the manipulated attacker graph.
The small community attack exploits the information loss in graph embeddings. While
community discovery works better at identifying islands and singletons, graph embeddings
may miss such signal given the hyperparamters chosen at deployment. Existing methods
for choosing hyperparameters do not account for potential small community attack oppor-
tunities. The downside of the attack is the agility cost. By removing nodes and edges
from G, the adversary has to give up control over nodes, redundancy, or even functionality.
In addition to losing nv, the agility cost can be measured by the change in graph density
(Equation 5.1) fromD(G) to the chosenD(G′). We define the following D(G) and D(G′):
D(G) = |E|




(|U | ∗ |V |)
(5.2)
A graph’s density ranges from [0, 1], which denote a graph with zero edges or all
possible edges, respectively. For D(G′) we consider how many edges are in E ′ compared
to the maximum possible number of edges between the original U and V . This normalizes
the number of edges by the structure of theG. The agility cost isD(G)−D(G′) ifD(G) >
D(G′), or zero if D(G) ≤ D(G′). A loss in density implies a potential loss of connectivity,
but maintaining or increasing the density bodes well for the attacker. They can afford an
even denser structure, yet still evade defenders. It is important to note that, while nv is lost,
this is reflected in the density score, as |V | includes any removed vertices like nv. A lower
density, and therefore a higher cost, is incurred when edges and/or vertices are removed
relative to the original structure seen in G.
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Consider an attack on Pleiades. Ĝ is created by completing G. To mount the attack
like G′2, the adversary partitions the domain names that are used to control her malware by
removing one of the control domains (nv=1), and then excludes two distinct hosts that query
each of the remaining domains (ne=2). In other words, the adversary can also randomly
choose one host (|U | − ne) to query each one of remaining control domains. This reduces
the density from D(G) = 0.5 to D(G′2) = 1/3, and sacrifices one node (nv).
If the adversary has knowledge that allows testing whether the attack is successful or
not, the attacker can increasingly remove domains and queries from hosts until clustering
G no longer results in G′ being extracted as a single cluster. In practice, as described in
Section 2.1, the subdivided G′ often ends up either as portions of the “death star” cluster;
or in multiple, noisy clusters. In both cases, the legitimate cluster is effectively hidden in a
forest of noise. In order to verify an attack was successful, however, an attacker must have
G or an approximation.
5.4 Attacks in Practice
We chose to attack Pleiades because it has been commercially deployed and relies on graph
modeling. Our reimplementation has similar performance, as shown in Appendix A.3. We
now describe portions of the reimplementation in detail.
5.4.1 Pleiades
An overview of Pleiades is shown in Figure 5.3. We focus our attacks on the clustering
component and use the classification phase to demonstrate attack success. First, Pleiades
clusters NXDOMAINs (V ) queried by local hosts (U ) using the host-domain bipartite
graph (G). It groups together NXDOMAINs queried by common hosts into clustersC0, . . . , Ck,
based on the assumption that hosts infected with the same DGA malware query similar
groups of DGA domains. The graph clustering can be achieved by either community dis-
























Figure 5.3: Overview of the DGA detection system.
Table 5.1: Summary of datasets and their availability to minimal, moderate, and perfect
knowledge attackers.
Dataset Number of Records Minimal Moderate Perfect
Reverse Engineered
DGA Domains 14 DGA Families; 395K NXD X X X
Host-NXDOMAIN
Graph (Surrogate) 8782 hosts; 210K NXD - X X
Host-NXDOMAIN
Graph (Ground Truth) average 262K hosts; 1.8M NXD - - X
Then the classification module computes domain name character distributions of each clus-
ter into a numerical feature vector, which is used to classify known DGA families. A new
unknown DGA family with features statistically similar to a known one can be detected by
this process. The system operates on daily NXDOMAIN traffic generated by all hosts in a
network using the following data sources.
Datasets
We use anonymized recursive DNS traffic from a large telecommunication company from
December 18, 2016 to December 29, 2016. The dataset contains NXDOMAINs queried by
hosts and the query timestamps. On average, there are 262 thousand unique anonymized
hosts, with 44.6 million queries to 1.8 million unique NXDOMAINs in a day. We use
this dataset to construct Host-NXDOMAIN Graph as ground truth without attack. This is
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available to defenders and perfect knowledge attackers.
As a surrogate network dataset, we use NXDOMAIN traffic from a large US univer-
sity network collected on December 25, 2016. It contains 8,782 hosts and 210 thousand
unique NXDOMAINs. Among these NXDOMAINs, only 227 appeared in the ground truth
network dataset. The surrogate dataset is available to attackers with moderate and perfect
knowledge.
Last but not least, we use a reverse engineered DGA domains dataset to train the su-
pervised component of the system. We run the reverse-engineered algorithms [127] to
generate DGA domains for 14 malware families: Chinad, Corebot, Gozi, Locky, Murofet,
Necurs, NewGOZ, PadCrypt ransomware, Pykspa, Qadars, Qakbot, Ranbyus, Sisron, and
Symmi. The training dataset also includes live DGA domains observed in the ground truth
network. We label 267 clusters belonging to four malware families present in the ground
truth network dataset (Pykspa, Suppobox, Murofet, and Gimemo), and manually verify that
these subgraphs are attack free. We train a Random Forest classifier with an average accu-
racy of 96.08%, and a false positive rate of 0.9%. The classifier trained from this dataset is
available for attackers of all knowledge levels. Table 5.1 summarizes these datasets.
We discovered 12 new DGA malware families in only 12 days using the ground truth
network traffic (see Appendix A.3 for details). We discovered real but unsuccessful evasion
attempts in the wild, and retrained our classifier with evasive instances. We believe we have
faithfully reimplemented Pleiades because we use comparable datasets and we achieve
similar clustering and modeling results.
5.4.2 Attacks
Using the notation described in Section 5.3, let G be a bipartite graph of the defender. U
represents hosts, both infected and uninfected, and V represent NXDOMAINs queried by
hosts in the underlying network. An edge exists from vi ∈ U and vj ∈ V iff the ith host
queried the jth NXDOMAIN. For an attacker graph G ⊂ G, the hosts in U are infected
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hosts under the control of the attacker. In the noise injection case, the attacker instructs their
malware to query NXDOMAINs beyond what is needed for normal operation, as shown in
Figure 5.1. In the small community case, the attacker coordinates the querying behavior of
their malware such that they query fewer NXDOMAINs in common, as in Figure 5.2. We
will evaluate the effectiveness of the attacks by the drop in predicted class probabilities and
the predicted label of the classifier. In a Random Forest, the predicted class probabilities of
a feature vector are calculated as the average predicted class probabilities of all trees in the
forest. In practice, if the predicted class probability decreases substantially, the classifier
will incorrectly label the instances, and the attack will be considered successful.
5.4.3 Attack Costs
To compute the anomaly cost for noise injection, we analyze percentile changes of edges
related to hosts in U in the structure of G from before and after the attack. We quantify
this change by computing the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs, example in Ap-
pendix A.1) of vertex degrees before and after a successful attack is mounted. Concretely,
if an attacker can evade Pleiades but raises the profile of their infected hosts from the 50th
(in the CDF before attack) to the 99.9th percentile of NXDOMAINs queried per host (in the
CDF after attack), a defender will be able to detect such behavior with simple thresholding
(i.e., monitoring hosts entering the 95th percentile).
To quantify the adversarial cost behind the small community attack, we measure the
change of attacker graph density D(G′) as defined in Section 5.5.3. If the attacker graph
density decreases, this means the attacker no longer uses NXDOMAINs for their infection
and/or the infected hosts query fewer NXDOMAINs in common, reducing their connectiv-
ity overall and increasing the botnet’s management cost.
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5.5 Results
First, we show how to select hyperparameters for each of the three graph methods. Next,
we present our results for both attacks against each graph based clustering technique, for
the three knowledge levels. Finally, we explain the costs incurred by the attacker, and how
these can be used to identify possible defenses.
Summary of Results Our attacks against the graph clustering component of Pleiades
gravely reduce the predicted class probability of the subsequent classification phase. Even
with minimal knowledge, an adversary can launch an effective targeted noise injection at-
tack dropping the median predicted class probability to 0%. In the higher knowledge levels,
the maximum predicted class probability can be as low as 10%. Using a set of labeled DGA
malware families observed in spectral clustering, the attacks reduce the prediction accuracy
from 99.6% to 0%.
In addition to being effective, the attacks do not substantially raise the anomaly pro-
file of infected hosts: before and after the targeted noise injection attacks the hosts occupy
a similar percentile for the number of NXDOMAINs queried. Small community attack
results show that the traditional way of choosing hyperparameters for generating graph
embeddings is insufficient when we analyze the system in an adversarial setting, because it
creates a large area for possible small community attack instances. While following the ac-
cepted methodology for selecting the rank for SVD and hyperparameters for node2vec, all
DGA clusters can be hidden in noisy clusters by subdividing the infected hosts into smaller
groups to sacrifice some agility, even while using hundreds of DGA domains. Even in the




























Figure 5.4: Scree plot of eigenvalues of SVD.
5.5.1 Choosing Hyperparamters
First, we carefully choose hyperparameters for the graph clustering methods in Pleiades to
ensure high quality clusters are generated.
Spectral Clustering
We use the scree plot shown in Figure 5.4 to choose the rank of SVD. We fix the rank
of the SVD to be 35, where the scree plot plateaus. While different than the 15 used in
the original Pleiades implementation [25], the underlying datasets are different so it is not
unreasonable to find different ranks.
Community Discovery
We use the best partition method from the NetworkX community discovery library [128]
which implements the Louvain algorithm [33]. The Louvain algorithm efficiently extracts
good communities on the graph by optimizing the modularity metric, which measures the
density of links within communities in comparison to outside them. It first sets each node to
be its own community, and iteratively merges them to maximize modularity. The algorithm
stops when a local maxima is reached. This community detection algorithm scales to large



































Figure 5.5: Using cluster validity metrics to choose walk length.
node2vec
We use traditional cluster validity metrics to compare different hyperparameters of node2vec.
Twelve DGA malware families, including both known and newly detected ones, were used
as reference clusters. We use validity metrics including Adjusted Rand Index, Complete-
ness, Fowlkes-Mallows index, Homogeneity, Normalized Mutual Information (NMI), pu-
rity, and V-Measure score. We first choose context size six, which has the first highest va-
lidity scores. Several larger context sizes generate equal validity scores, but they produce
noisier clusters. This is because that larger context sizes in DNS graphs tend to include
more noisy nodes, such as popular benign NXDOMAINs, or popular hosts that are likely
proxies.
Then we choose the walk length according to Figure 5.5. Multiple walk length values
produce high validity scores, but we choose walk length 20, which corresponds to the
second highest peak. Because using walk length 20 generates cleaner Murofet clusters
than a walk length smaller than 10, due to the fact that longer walk length provides more
samples of neighborhoods and the model is learned better. The number of walks per node,
dimensions, and SGD epoch does not show much difference. We decide on 15 walks, 60
dimensions, and one learning epoch after manual inspection. Lastly, we use a uniform
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random probability to choose the next node in the random walk process.
5.5.2 Targeted Noise Injection
We run our version of Pleiades to generate all attacker graphs. Four DGA families were
identified: Pykspa, Suppobox, Murofet, and Gimemo. For each we extract the attacker
graphs (G) and the target domains (V ). These domains are labeled using the classifier from
Section 5.4.1. Before and after the attack, there can be multiple clusters formed within G
and G′, depending on the graph clustering technique. We use the classifier model to test
how likely it is that each cluster belongs to the true DGA malware family, both before and
after the attack. We present the overall distribution of the predicted class probabilities to
show the impact of the attacks.
We use different types of noisy domains at different knowledge levels. For a DGA,
these nodes are new NXDOMAINs (V ′) that will be classified as benign, also queried by
the infected hosts (U ). In the minimal knowledge case, we create a DGA algorithm that
is classified as benign. It is a dictionary DGA that uses the most popular English words
from movie subtitles [129], popular web terms, and the top one million Alexa domains.
We randomly add numbers and dashes, and randomly select a top-level domain from four
choices. In addition, we generate some punycode domains that start with the character
sequence “xn–”, and some domains with a “www” subdomain. We generate 59,730 verified
NXDOMAINs. In the perfect and moderate knowledge cases, the adversary uses existing,
unpopular NXDOMAINs from G and the surrogate dataset, respectively.
Spectral Clustering
Figure 5.6a shows the classifier’s predicted true class probabilities from before the attack is
mounted, and after the minimal, moderate, and perfect knowledge targeted noise injection
attacks are performed. For each knowledge level, we inject two different levels of noise as
described in Section 5.5.2 and re-run the clustering and subsequent classification to assess
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the damage from the targeted noise injection. Recall that we try two attack variants, attack
variant 1 and 2, where we inject one or two mirrored sets of vertices and edges, respectively.
This is to both i) understand how much noise is needed to yield successful evasion, and ii)
determine the cost incurred by adding noise.
Spectral clustering generates 267 DGA clusters from the four malware families across
12 days. Before the attack, only 0.4% clusters (1 out of 267) are predicted with the wrong
labels. In comparison, after the attacks, all clusters are predicted with the wrong labels.
Next, we will examine the predicted class probabilities change in the true class label.
Figure 5.6a uses the violin plots to show the distribution of predicted class probabilities
for the true DGA families, before and after the attacks. The circle is the median value,
the thick line within the violin indicates interquartile range, and the thin line depicts a
95% confidence interval. The shape of the violin shows the distribution of the probability
values. For example, the first violin in Figure 5.6a has a median of 100% predicted class
probabilities, and all data points in the interquartile range have 100% probability value.
Specifically, before the attacks, 238 clusters are predicted with 100% class probability that
they belong to the true class, and only 28 clusters have a probability between 60% and
100%. For example, the Pykspa cluster had a class probability of only 10% because it
contained only two domain names that had very different feature distributions from the
majority of Pykspa clusters. The two variants of the attack introduced at least 50% and
66% noise to the DGA clusters.
Minimal Knowledge After the attacks, we classify each new adversarial cluster contain-
ing target domains and plot the target class probability distributions in the Figure 5.6a.
Attack variant 1 (“Minimal Benign DGA 1”) generated new clusters with≤ 80% predicted
class probability, with a median of 0%. The predicted class probabilities of 84% of the new
clusters drop to zero. Attack variant 2 further decreases the classifier prediction confidence,


























































































































































(c) Retraining: Predicted class probabilities.
Figure 5.6: Figure 5.6a: Predicted class probabilities before the targeted noise injection
attack and after two variants of the targeted noise injection attack in minimal, moderate, and
perfect knowledge. Figure 5.6b: Predicted class probabilities before and after the targeted
noise injection attacks for community discovery and node2vec. Figure 5.6c: Predicted
class probabilities under different attacks after retraining including the “Minimal Benign
DGA 1” clusters.
domains, the predicted class probabilities of 87% of the new clusters plummet to 0%. The
overall distribution of prediction confidences also shifts downward compared to “Minimal
Benign DGA 1”.
Perfect Knowledge The median of predicted class probabilities for DGA malware fami-
lies drops to 10%. As depicted by “Perfect Long Tail 1” in Figure 5.6a, 86% of adversarial
clusters were assigned the probabilities of belonging to the true DGA class that are at most
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10% . The distribution of class probability values has a smaller variance compared to those
in the “Minimal Benign DGA 1”. “Perfect Long Tail 2” in Figure 5.6a shows that the
maximum prediction confidence is 30%, slightly lower than the maximum 40% confidence
from the targeted noise injection attack of “Minimal Benign DGA 2”.
Moderate Knowledge We see similar results for the two targeted noise injection attack
variants in the moderate knowledge case as in the other cases: a strong drop in predicted
class probabilities, with a smaller, more compact distribution of values for attack variant 2.
After attack variant 1, 98.3% of new clusters were assigned less than 20% confidence; after
attack variant 2, 98.8% of new clusters have less than 20% confidence.
Spectral clustering can be largely defeated at all knowledge levels using the targeted
noise injection attacks.
Since previous experiments show that minimal knowledge attackers can carry out tar-
geted noise injection as effectively as more powerful attackers, we will simply demonstrate
that the same targeted noise injection attack variant 1 in minimal knowledge also works
with community discovery and node2vec.
Community Discovery
We use the same set of DGA domains labeled in Spectral Clustering for evaluation. Before
the attack, 80% clusters can be predicted with the correct label, which dropped to 2% after
the attack. Figure 5.6b shows the predicted class probabilities for communities containing
all target domains before and after the attack. Before the attack, the median of predicted
probabilities is 90%, and the interquartile range is from 50% to 100%. Specifically, 71
communities contain target domains, among which ten communities only contain one tar-
get domain, and seven communities have between 40% to 70% target domains. These
noisy communities formed the lower part of the distribution, with ≤ 50% predicted class
probabilities in “Community Before Attack”, as shown in Figure 5.6b. After the attack, the
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Table 5.2: Anomaly cost as percentile of the distinct number of NXDOMAINs queried by
hosts, before and after the attack. Only 9.12% of infected hosts become more suspicious,
while the rest remain the same.
Before Attack < 95th Percentile, 9.12% of hosts
Average Increase From Percentile To Percentile
Attack Variant 1 69.86% 88.73%
Attack Variant 2 69.86% 93.98%
Before Attack ≥ 95th Percentile, 90.88% of hosts
Average Increase From Percentile To Percentile
Attack Variant 1 99.74% 99.85%
Attack Variant 2 99.74% 99.88%
median class probability craters to 0%. Overall 98% of new communities were predicted
with lower than 50% probability of belonging to the true class, and 86% of communities
have lower than 10% class probabilities.
This demonstrates that the targeted noise injection attack is also effective against the
community discovery algorithm.
node2vec
Using the same set of DGA domains labeled in Spectral Clustering, before the attack, 89%
clusters can be predicted with the correct label, which dropped to 0.8% after the attack.
Figure 5.6b shows that, before the attack on node2vec, the median of predicted probabilities
is 100%, and the interquartile range is from 90% to 100%. A total of 85% of clusters were
predicted with at least 70% class probability. After the attack, 92% clusters have at most
10% predicted class probabilities.
Targeted noise injection attack also evades node2vec embeddings.
Targeted Noise Injection Costs
It is simple for malware to query additional domains, however, infected hosts engaging in
such queries may become more suspicious and easier to detect due to the extra network
signal they produce. This may cause the anomaly cost of the targeted noise injection attack
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to be high enough to render it useless.
We analyze the anomaly cost by measuring the infected host percentile of the NXDO-
MAIN distribution both before and after the attacks for the two variants of the targeted noise
injection attacks, summarized in Table 5.2. Before any attack, only 9.12% of infected hosts
ranked lower than 95th percentile, and the remaining 90.88% of them ranked higher than
95th percentile. This means that, without any attack, infected hosts were already query-
ing more unique NXDOMAINs than most hosts in the network. However, doing targeted
noise injection attacks further increases the percentile ranks of the infected hosts, but not
substantially.
We separated the results based on whether infected hosts were querying fewer domains
than 95% of all hosts in the local network. Table 5.2 shows that among the 9.12% infected
hosts ranked lower than 95th percentile before the attack, they increased from an average
percentile of 69.86% to 88.73% after the targeted noise injection attack variant 1. Further-
more, they increased to 93.98% after attack variant 2. However, 90.88% of infected hosts
did not become more anomalous. They were ranked higher than the 95th percentile before
the attack. Their average percentile increased by 0.11% after attack variant 1, and by 0.14%
after attack variant 2. Because they were querying more domains than other hosts before
the attack, injecting noise does not change their percentile substantially.
The majority of hosts had little change in “suspiciousness”, whereas a small percentage
of hosts increased their suspiciousness after the targeted noise injection attacks.
5.5.3 Small Community
We choose a group of 618 domains and 10 infected hosts belonging to Suppobox as the
basis for the small community attack. They form a community using the community dis-
covery algorithm, and two clusters using spectral or node2vec embeddings. A small com-
munity attack is successful if and only if all DGA domains join either the “death star,” or
clusters where the subsequent classifier does not predict them as the true malware DGA
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class. Recall that the death star cluster contains tens of thousands of domains that cannot
be properly classified. In all experiments, the small community plots denote the configura-
tions where an attack succeeds based on the aforementioned criteria. This is represented by
green regions (see Figure 5.7) when the “death star” is joined, or white cells when the noisy
clusters cannot be predicted as the true class label (see Figure 5.9) when using node2vec.
Spectral Clustering
As described earlier, the small community attack can only be verified in the perfect and
moderate knowledge cases. In the minimal knowledge case, however, an attacker can still
mount the attack by randomly removing edges and nodes, as described in Section 5.2, while
hoping for the best.
Minimal Knowledge The upper-leftmost plot in Figure 5.7 demonstrates the possible
successful configurations for mounting the small community attack by randomly removing
nodes and edges. The plot shows the remaining number of NXDOMAINs on the Y-axis
(|V | − nv) and the remaining number of connections from infected hosts for each NX-
DOMAIN on the X-axis (|U | − ne). The shaded region shows approximately a 75.16%
success rate for an attacker with no knowledge of the defender’s graph G. While a mini-
mal knowledge attacker cannot guarantee their attack will succeed, they nonetheless have
a high chance of success.
Perfect Knowledge The upper-left plot in Figure 5.7 depicts a successful small commu-
nity attack area when the computed SVD rank is 35. The figure shows that only a small
set of configurations with 380 to 618 DGA domains, each queried by between 3 to 10 ran-
dom hosts, were unable to successfully launch a small community attack. The cost of the
small community attack is very low against the system, which is configured with rank 35
and runs in this network. For example, an adversary controlling the DGA does not need
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Small Community Attack Successful False True
Figure 5.7: Different number of eigenvalues.
a common set of DGA domains from 618 to 380 in order to hide the domains. In this
case, by removing nv = 238 NXDOMAINs, the attacker does not lose any additional host
querying activities min(ne) = 0. But if the attacker needs extra redundancy provided by
460 distinct NXDOMAINs, each domain can only be queried by a subset of 5 hosts. Then
nv = 158, and accordingly, min(ne) = 5. In this case, the attacker does not need to lose
control of any infected hosts, but she does need to coordinate each five infected hosts to
query a subset of distinct NXDOMAINs that do not overlap with each other.
Moderate Knowledge After reducing the number of DGA domains and the number of
infected hosts per domain to the successful attack area shown in Figure 5.8, the DGA
domains join the surrogate death star. We test that these values also work to join the original
death star. Because the original network size is larger than the surrogate network size, the
real successful area (the top-left plot in Figure 5.7) is much bigger than the one shown
Figure 5.8. Thus, the small community attack works with moderate knowledge when the
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Figure 5.8: Success area for joining the death star of the surrogate dataset in the moder-
ate knowledge case. All the successful attack configurations worked in the ground truth
network.
a larger network, the adversary may miscalculate the cost of joining the death star, which
may not work in the original network. By using such a surrogate dataset, the adversary will
likely choose fewer DGA domains and their shared hosts to simulate a successful attack,
compared to the ideal case in perfect knowledge. In other words, the practical cost of
launching a small community attack with moderate knowledge is more than the minimal
cost of such an attack in the original network. We explore the effect of network size in
Section 5.5.3.
Spectral clustering can be evaded using the small community attack, even when the
attack cannot be verified by the attacker with a success rate of 75%+. More sophisticated
attackers can always evade.
Community Discovery
Unlike graph embedding techniques that lose information about smaller components of
the graph, community discovery algorithms do not lose information and can properly han-
dle portions of G with exactly one edge. Rather than clustering poorly with other small
components, they are considered to be separate communities. So the cost of the small com-
munity attack is much higher than with graph embeddings because attackers must generate
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Small Community Attack Successful False True
Figure 5.9: Success area of small community attacks with different context size.
disconnected. Therefore, they can evade clustering with the cost of losing their ability to
efficiently manage their bots. For example, to evade community discovery in the example
presented in Figure 5.2, an attacker would have to use the modified attack graph G′4 and the
drop from D(G) = 0.5 to D(G′4) = 0.25 is enough to consider the attack cost too high. In
the DGA case, this would mean each infection would need its own distinct domain-name
generation algorithm, which would be an exceedingly high cost for an attacker. As such,
we do not compute results for small community attacks on community discovery.
Community discovery is resistant to the small community attack due to the high costs
it would cause the attacker, however, spectral methods and node2vec are more likely to be
used by defenders as they result in cleaner clusters and better classification results.
node2vec
The third plot in Figure 5.9 shows that the small community attack is still possible with
node2vec, using aforementioned hyperparameters (Section 5.5.1). The attack is possible
when the number of shared hosts is 1 (the first column except the top cell), and when the
number of DGA domains is ≤ 40 (the bottom two rows). Elsewhere, the attack succeeds
randomly due to the random walk. In summary, the small community attack is definitely
possible with very small component sizes. Compared to SVD, the cost is higher here. For
example, the attacker needs to give up nv = 578 unique NXDOMAINs in a day, along
with ne = 0, for the small community attack to be successful. But if the attacker is not
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willing to give up such cost, the small community attack is not guaranteed to succeed given
the randomness of neighborhood sampling. However, if a minimal knowledge attacker
randomly chooses any nv and ne for a small community attack, she will have a 70.65%
attack success rate shown by the third plot in Figure 5.9.
node2vec is susceptible to the small community attack, but with fewer guarantees and
higher costs than in the spectral case, due to its inherent randomness. node2vec being used
in Pleiades would render the system more resilient against small community attacks.
Small Community Costs
The cost of the small community attack is affected by both the size of network and change
in density when the attack is performed.
Size of Network The network size is related to the number of nodes (hosts and domains)
and the number of edges (the query relationship). As a straightforward way to model the
network size, we randomly sample the hosts in the ground truth network dataset along with
all domains queried. We also keep the same attacker subgraph G, containing the Suppobox
DGA community with 10 infected hosts and 618 DGA domains, along with other domains
queried by these hosts for the experiment.
Figure 5.10 shows the small community attack results by sampling 10% to 90% of
all hosts. When only 10% of hosts were sampled, the small community attack failed in
most areas of the plot. The attack success area increases as the network size gets larger.
This means that the cost for small community attack is lower in a larger network than in a
smaller network, given the same hyperparameters. A larger network is harder to accurately
represent in an embedding, which provides more areas for attackers to hide and evade.
A moderate knowledge level attacker should attempt to acquire a surrogate network
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Sample 90% of All Hosts
Small Community Attack Successful False True
Figure 5.10: Different sizes of the network dataset.
Agility Cost By removing nodes and edges, the attacker loses redundancy. For example,
hosts need to query fewer DGA domains, or malware can be allowed fewer malicious
actions. We measure the agility cost by the change in density of the attack graph. Density
captures the number of edges present in the attack graph over the maximal number of
possible edges. In Section 5.5.3, Equation 5.1 defines the attack graph density before the
small community attack; and Equation 5.2 defines the density after the attack. Before
the attack, D(G) = 0.48 for the Suppobox community. For each SVD rank parameter,
we record attack configurations that were successful small community attacks as green
ares in Figure 5.7. There are some outliers outside the continuous area. Although these
attacks do not make NXDOMAINs join the death star, they move NXDOMAINs to clusters
that cannot be predicted with the correct label. To measure the minimum agility cost, we
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Join Death Star Median Maximum Minimum Cost
SVD rank 35 0.078 0.61 0
SVD rank 50 0.11 0.45 0.03
SVD rank 80 0.065 0.26 0.22
SVD rank 100 0.052 0.19 0.29
SVD rank 200 0.0032 0.10 0.38




Neighborhood Size 6 0.065 0.415
Number of Walks 5 0.065 0.415
Number of Walks 10 0.032 0.45
Number of Walks 15 0.065 0.415
Walk Length 2 0.65 0
Walk Length 4 0.29 0.19
Walk Length 12 0.065 0.415
Walk Length 20 0.065 0.415
exclude the outliers by only calculating attacker graph density that resulted in joining the
death star. Table 5.3 summarizes the median and maximum attacker graph density in these
small community attacks, with the minimum cost represented by the difference between
D(G) and max(D(G′)). When the SVD rank is 35, the max(D(G′)) to join the death
star is slightly bigger than D(G), which means there is no cost in launching the small
community attack. In this case, the attacker can evade while having more connectivity. As
the SVD rank increases, the attacker graph density is reduced, which means a successful
attack is more costly to the adversary. Also, the minimum cost increases as the SVD rank
increases. For example, when the SVD rank is 80, the minimum cost is 0.22, reducing
the attack graph density from 0.48 to 0.26. The attacker needs to reduce the number of
distinct DGA domains from 618 to 160 to evade, but each domain can be queried by all
infected hosts. In comparison, when the SVD rank is 200, the minimum cost is 0.38. The
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Small Community Attack Successful False True
Figure 5.11: Success area of small community attacks with different number of walks.
each domain queried by all infected hosts. The attack graph density is reduced from 0.48
to 0.1, losing 79% (0.38
0.48
) of queries to distinct DGA domains. This means that tuning
hyperparameters can increase the small community attack cost and potentially render this
attack ineffective.
Similarly, for node2vec, the minimum cost of a certain small community attack is
higher than spectral clustering. We compute the attacker graph density only for the white
area in Figure 5.9 without randomness, i.e., the first column and bottom two rows. In con-
trast to spectral clustering, node2vec requires a much higher minimum cost for a guaranteed
small community attack, which indicates that node2vec is more resilient to this attack. The
smallest communities in Figure 5.9 (i.e., the first column and bottom two rows) are likely
undersampled, because choosing 15 walks per node and walk length 20 using cluster va-
lidity in Section 5.5.1 prefers labeled DGA communities that are relatively bigger, which
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Small Community Attack Successful False True
Figure 5.12: Success area of small community attacks with different walk length.
allows small community attacks. Note the randomness in the remaining portion of the plot.
Since node2vec uses the random walk process to sample the neighborhoods of all nodes,
there exists randomness in the neighborhood observations. This shows that the randomness
inherent to node2vec makes the attacks succeed at random in the remaining portion of Fig-
ure 5.9. This both suggests a system like Pleiades would benefit from node2vec to reduce
the guarantee of attacks, as well as allow a defender to identify if an attacker is evading
by chance encounters where the evasion fails over time. While the minimum attack cost is
the same with different neighborhood sizes for a guaranteed successful attack, the attack
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success rate changes. The neighborhood sizes 2, 4, and 6 have attack success rate 65.16%,
60.65%, and 70.65% respectively (Figure 5.9). We will discuss how we can use differ-
ent hyperparameters to further reduce the success rate of the small community attack in
Section 5.6.2.
Despite the differences in the attack success rate, different neighborhood sizes in our
experiments have the same minimum cost for the small community attack. In comparison,
number of walks has slightly different minimum cost over different parameter values. As
shown in Figure 5.11 and Table 5.3, the minimum cost for guaranteed small community
attack under different number of walks are 0.415 or 0.45. However, Figure 5.12 and Ta-
ble 5.3 show that different values for the walk length parameter have different minimum
attack cost. When the walk length is 2, there is no attack cost; but when the walk length
is 20 (the parameter we choose by using cluster validity), the minimum cost is 0.415. In
Section 5.6.2, we will show that walk length 2 and 4 have higher small community attack
success rate than longer walk lengths.
These costs further demonstrate node2vec’s superiority over spectral clustering in re-
sisting small community attacks.
5.6 Defense
Since the noise injection attack and the small community attack violate the fundamental
assumptions used by graph clustering techniques, it is very hard to completely eliminate
the problem. In this section, we propose two defense techniques that help Pleiades retain
its detection capabilities against the two attacks. The first one is to train the classifier with
noise, which remediates the noise injection attack to some extent. The second one is to use
the small community attack as an adversarial guideline to choose better hyperparameters
for graph embeddings, which increases the cost of launching a successful small community
attack.
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Table 5.4: False Positive Rate for four DGA families before retraining, and after retraining
with three types of noise.
False Positive Rate
Model Pykspa Gimemo Suppobox Murofet
Original 0.32% 0.29% 0% 0%
Model A 1.64% 0.39% 0.10% 0%
Model B 1.62% 0.10% 1.23% 0.30%
Model C 1.46% 1.17% 1.23% 0%
5.6.1 Training Classifier with Noise
By retraining the classifier, it becomes more resistant to noise that could be injected by
the adversary in the unsupervised phase of Pleiades. We used domains from the benign
DGA to poison the clusters of malicious DGAs. We retrained the classifier using clusters
generated by the noise injection attack variant 1 (“Minimal Benign DGA 1”, m = 1, Al-
gorithm 2 in Section 5.5.2) from SVD, yielding model A. We tested model A against the
adversarial clusters generated by the same noise injection attack under community discov-
ery and node2vec. The first two violins in Figure 5.6c show that model A increases the
overall predicted class probabilities compared to the “After Attack” violins in Figure 5.6a.
In community discovery, the accuracy increased from 2% to 98%; and in node2vec, the
accuracy increased from 0.8% to 98%. To summarize, retraining with noisy clusters con-
taining a benign DGA from SVD can remediate the same attack on community discovery
and node2vec. We see this same effect even when the noise levels are doubled (m = 2,
Algorithm 2 in Section 5.5.2). When models were trained with half the noise (m = 1,
Algorithm 2 in Section 5.5.2), they were able to more accurately predict the correct la-
bel. Among them, only an average of 7.3% clusters are predicted with the wrong labels,
decreased from 100% before retraining.
In comparison with Figure 5.6a, the average prediction confidence increased signifi-
cantly. Before retraining, the average prediction confidence of “Minimal Benign DGA 2”,
“Moderate 2”, and “Perfect Long Tail 2” are 10%, 20%, and 20%. After retraining, they
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increased to 70%, 90%, and 80%, respectively. The accuracy of the models remain roughly
the same before and after retraining. However, retraining with noisy clusters increased the
false positive rate in most cases (Table 5.4).
It is important to note that this defense only trains the classifier with noise that has been
witnessed. New noise will appear, but the fundamental attack on the unsupervised com-
ponent remains the same. Therefore, defenders will be alerted by plumetting accuracies in
their models. Our defenses are simple and future work should be done to make clustering
systems more robust.



















































Figure 5.13: Figure 5.13a: Using the small community attack to choose the number of
eigenvalues for SVD. Figure 5.13b: Using the small community attack to choose the length
of walk for node2vec.
Small community attacks show that the traditional ways of choosing hyperparameters
(Section 5.5.1) is not enough when facing adversaries. Luckily, the small community at-
tack can be used to choose more resistant hyperparameters. We show that better selection
can reduce the number of successful small community attack instances from our previous
experiments.
We plot the successful attack rate under different number of eigenvalues in Figure 5.13a.
The successful attack rate decreases as the number of eigenvalues computed increases, and
the line plateaus after 200 eigenvalues. It means that a defender running Pleiades should
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select the first 200 eigenvalues, instead of 35 indicated by the scree plot in Figure 5.4. If
we use the small community attack in this way, we can choose better parameters for the
system and also know under which parameters the system is vulnerable.
Similarly, for node2vec, using the small community attack to choose hyperparameters
can reduce the attack success rate. The cluster validity metrics suggest we choose neigh-
borhood size six, and walk length of 20. However, if we evaluate the graph clustering
using the success rate of the small community attack, these hyperparameters are not opti-
mal. First, for the neighborhood size, Figure 5.9 shows that a smaller neighborhood size of
four introduces a lower attack success rate. Second, we plot the attack success rate under
different walk lengths in Figure 5.13b. This figure shows that a walk length of 12 is pre-
ferred over 20, because the former allows 51.29% attack success rate compared to 61.61%
of the latter. In other words, the smaller neighborhood size and shorter walk length can
tolerate the small community attack better, presumably because they do not oversample
larger communities with more distinct neighborhood observations. In other words, smaller
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Figure 5.14: Figure 5.14a: Using the small community attack to choose the number of
walks per node for node2vec. Figure 5.14b: Using the small community attack to choose
the neighborhood size for node2vec.
In addition, two more parameters of node2vec can be tuned by using the small com-
munity attack. Figure 5.14a shows the sensitivity of parameter, different number of walks
per node, to the small community attack. Under 15 walks per node, the small community
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attack success rate is 70.65%. Overall, the attack success rate increases as the number of
walks increases. If we want the minimal small community attack success rate, we should
choose smaller number of walks per node, such as 5 or 10. Using 5 walks per node can
reduce the attack success rate to 53.23%. Similar to our results of tuning the walk length, a
smaller value for number of walks prefer small communities, but a larger value undersam-
ples small communities. Lastly, different values of the neighborhood size parameter have
slightly different attack success rate, as shown in Figure 5.14b. Overall, from neighbor-
hood size 2 to 20, the attack success rate oscillates between 59.68% and 71.94%. However,
the neighborhood size is less sensitive to the small community attack than the walk length
and the number of walks.
We recommend using the small community attack success rate to evaluate the clustering
hyperparameter selection, in addition to traditional cluster validity indices.
5.7 Summary
We have demonstrated that generic attacks on graphs can break a real-world system that
uses several popular graph-based modeling techniques. These attacks can often be per-
formed by limited adversaries at low cost; however, simple defenses can reduce their ef-
fectiveness or likelihood of success. To summarize how defenders can improve their sys-
tems: hyperparameter selection should be optimized for reducing the success rate of small
community attacks, and retraining can be used to lessen the impact of noise injection at-
tacks. Furthermore, state of the art graph embedding techniques like node2vec appear to be
more resistant against small community attacks, which suggests Pleiades and other systems
would be harder to adversarially manipulate using node2vec over community finding, or
spectral methods (see Figure 5.9 vs. Figure 5.7).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Overall Contribution and Summary
This thesis focuses on two goals, DNS graph clustering applications and improving the
robustness of clustering. For the first goal, we propose new clustering techniques to solve
two long-term advertising fraud problems. For the second goal, we propose a threat model
to evaluate how attackers with different knowledge levels can evade clustering. We propose
two novel yet simple attacks. Through the adversarial clustering analysis, we can identify
where the clustering system is vulnerable, and how we can improve the robustness of the
system.
6.2 Future Work
We acknowledge that details surrounding the implementation of our adversarial clustering
attacks are specific to Pleiades, however, the graph representation suggests the attacks may
work on other graph-based systems. In this section, we briefly discuss issues to consider to
generalize the attacks, as well as future work direction.
In other types of security graphs, an attacker needs to perform different actions in order
to manipulate nodes and edges in the attacker graph. Overall, an attacker needs to associate
her nodes with benign ones for the targeted noise injection attack, and reduce overlap of
her nodes’ behavior for the small community attack. For instance, in the bipartite graph
of machines (U ) and md5s of installed executables (V ) [130], malware authors can bun-
dle malicious executables with benign ones via Pay-Per-Install (PPI) programs, in order to
inject noise; or they can program the installed malware to write to different md5s for dif-
ferent machines, and delete their old malware, in order to small communities. As another
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example, in the malware behavioral graph between the binary (U ) and its behavioral profile
or Malware Instruction Set (V ) [123, 131, 27], the malware authors can change the exe-
cutable’s system call frequency and sequence to approximate what benign software does,
in order to inject noise; or they can make system call sequence as distinct permutations for
different machines, in order to create small communities.
Nodes and edges can be trivially injected or removed in the graph Pleiades uses, which
are generated by malware resolving domain names. In other security contexts, the set of
injectable/removable nodes varies. It is possible that some nodes and edges must exist in
order for certain attack actions to succeed. For example, a phishing email using a malicious
attachment requires at least the read system call to successfully infect a host, which cannot
be removed from the system call graph. On the other hand, it can be difficult to add certain
nodes and edges. Therefore, in addition to the anomaly cost (Section 5.5.2) and agility
cost (Section 5.5.3), the action of graph manipulation itself has costs depending on the
data that underlies the graph representation. This should be carefully considered when
generalizing the attacks to other systems. Tighter costs may exist, but our approaches point
in a promising direction.
Results from our adversarial clustering analysis show that the small community attack
is not guaranteed to succeed if an adversary does not have perfect knowledge about other
nodes on the entire graph, or the clustering system parameters. Since the defender running
the clustering system is essentially using global features, it provides an advantage against
adversaries. On the other hand, it is beneficial to choose global features over local features
for classification tasks as well. For instance, pixels from an image, words in an email, and
metadata of PDFs are local features, which can be easily manipulated by adversaries. On
the contrary, if features can be chosen that requires knowledge about other images, emails,
PDFs that an attacker does not have easy access to, it makes the classifier more robust.
For example, in domain name reputation systems, the set of related historical IP addresses
resolved by domain names over a time window (e.g., past six months) is a global feature.
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If an evasive attacker changes domain name resolution at the moment of detection, it does
not change the feature easily because resolutions from the past are still used by the feature.
Guidelines for how to change local features to global features can increase the costs for






A.1 Unique Domains queried by Hosts
Figure A.1 shows the cumulative distribution for distinct number of NXDOMAINs queried
by hosts seen on 12/18/2016 in the network datasets from the telecommunication network.
The CDF shows that a host querying two distinct NXDOMAINs is at the 48th percentile,
and a host querying 10 distinct NXDOMAINs is at the 95th percentile.
A.2 Labeled DGA Families
We use default parameters to generate different versions of the malware families for 18
different seed dates. The number of domains generated for each malware family is recorded
in the top part of Table A.1.
A.3 Reimplementing Pleiades
We implement a simplified version of the Pleiades DGA detection system. We follow the
exact next steps to implement the graph clustering and modeling components of Pleiades.
1. From the NXDOMAIN query data, we filter out hosts that only queried one domain
name in a day (as the authors of Pleiades did).
2. We construct an association matrix representing the bipartite graph between hosts
and the NXDOMAINs they queried. Each row represents one host and each column
represents one NXDOMAIN. If host i queried NXDOMAIN j in that day, we assign
weight wij = 1 in the matrix. Otherwise, we assign wij = 0. Then, each row is













Figure A.1: Cumulative distribution of distinct number of NXDOMAINs queried by each
host in 12/18/2016.
3. Next, we do Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) over this matrix and keep the first
N eigenvalues. For our dataset, we choose N = 35 according to the scree plot of
Eigenvalues. Figure 5.4 shows that the Eigenvalues line plateaus after N >= 35.
4. The resulting eigenvectors are used for XMeans clustering.
5. Once we have the clusters of NXDOMAINs, we extract a feature vector for each
cluster, which will be used for classification. We have four feature families: length,
entropy, pairwise jaccard distance of character distribution, and pairwise dice dis-
tance of bigram distribution. This yields a 36-length feature vector for classification
that relies on properties of the domain strings themselves. Please refer to Section
4.1.1 in the original Pleiades paper [25] for further details.
6. Finally, the classifier uses the feature vectors of the clusters to detect existing, known
DGAs and identify never-before-seen DGAs.
To obtain DGA domains as a training dataset for the classifier, we analyzed dynamic
malware execution traffic and executed reverse-engineered DGA algorithms. Firstly, we
identified NXDOMAINs that were queried by malware md5s by analyzing malware pcaps
obtained from a security vendor. We used AVClass [132] to get the malware family labels
of those md5s. Using this method, we labeled pykspa, suppobox, and gimemo malware
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Table A.1: DGA families contained within our ground truth dataset.


















families, which were active in our dataset. We extract one feature family per cluster for
these. Secondly, we use reverse engineered DGA domains to compensate limited visibility
of DGAs active in the network dataset. Although only Pykspa, Suppobox, and Murofet do-
mains have matches in active clusters, we extract one feature vector for each version’s daily
domains of 14 DGA families from the reversed engineered DGA domain dataset. Table A.1
shows the distribution of the number of features vectors from the reverse engineered DGAs
(top) and those seen in clusters (bottom).
We trained the classifier with 17 classes, including 16 malware families and one man-
ually labeled benign class. We labeled benign class from clusters containing mixture of
all kinds of benign domains, as well as clusters containing disposable domains (e.g., DNS
queries to Anti-Virus online reputation products [133]).
We performed model selection to choose among the following algorithms: Naive Bayes,
Linear SVM, Random Forest, Logistic Regression and Stochastic Gradient Descent Clas-





































































































Figure A.4: Newly found DGAs.
Random Forest as our classifier. Random Forests are similar to Alternative Decision Trees,
a boosted tree-based classifier, which were used in the original Pleiades paper. We tested
our classifier with five fold cross-validation and measured an average accuracy at 96.08%,
and a false positive rate of 0.9%. Figure A.2 shows the multi-class ROC curves of the clas-
sifier performance. Figure A.3 shows the micro and macro ROC curves of the multi-class
classifier in our implementation of Pleiades.
A.4 Current DGA Landscape
We ran the DGA detection system over anonymized network traffic from a Recursive DNS
server in a telecommunication provider, from December 18, 2016 to December 29, 2016.
Newly Discovered DGAs We found 12 new DGA malware families. Figure A.4 shows
5 of them. New DGA A is classified as similar to the DGA Chinad, with a total of 59,904
domains. The generated domains have a fixed length of 18 characters and use five dif-
ferent tlds: .com, .net, .cn, .biz, and .ru. Chinad has similar characteristics in domain
names, but its domain length is 16 characters, and it uses two additional tlds: .info and
.org. New DGA B is a dictionary-words DGA that is classified as similar to Gozi. Gozi
generates domains by combining words from word lists such as Requests for Comments
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(RFC), the Ninety Five Theses of Martin Luther in its original Latin text, and GNU Gen-
eral Public License (GNU GPL). In 12 days, we observed 9815 domain names from this
DGA, with 10,435 infected hosts. New DGA C is classified as similar to Gimemo. It
repeatedly uses bigrams and trigrams as units for composing domain name strings. We
found 6,738 domains for new DGA C. Most of the domains from DGA C follow a pat-
tern of consonant-vowel-consonant at the beginning, usually followed by another similar
pattern or a sequence of vowel-consonant-vowel, which makes the generated domains ap-
pear almost readable. Nevertheless, New DGA C generated domains did not follow the
character frequency distribution for any of the languages that use the English or similar
alphabets. The length of the generated domains is not fixed but it appears to be around
10 characters with either a character added or removed. New DGA D uses .com tld, and
second-level labels varying between 12 and 18 characters. New DGA E-v1 iterates through
both algorithm-generated second level domains and child labels.
Evasion Attempts in the Wild The DGAs of qakbot and pykspa provide us with evi-
dence that the malware authors are attempting to avoid or obstruct detection. A special
mode of Qakbot is triggered when the malware detects that it is running inside a sandbox
environment. Specifically, the seed of the algorithm is appended to generate redundant do-
mains that won’t be used as actual C&C. Similary, Pykspa generates two sets of domains
based on two different seed sets, which appear identical to a human analyst as if there were
only one set of generated domains. Different than Qakbot, in normal operation Pykspa
queries both sets of domains, along a list of benign domains. This kind of behavior could
be a method to detect analysis efforts. If an analyst sets the environment to provide answers
to these “bogus” queries, it could indicate anomaly to the malware. Generating a large
number of “fake” domains could also increase the cost of sinkholing the botnets. It makes
the sinkholing operation more likely to fail to cover all of the actual C&C domains [134].
These efforts appear to be in their infancy in terms of complexity and effectiveness at this
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point. If malware authors unleash their creativity in the future, we might come across more
elaborate evasion cases that require a lot more effort to identify and detect.
Furthermore, we identify instances of DGAs already evading the classification part of
Pleiades by introducing a child label. Our classifier has low confidence for detecting new
DGAs B, C, and E-v1. Since there are no DGA domains with child labels in the training
dataset, the classifier does not have the requisite knowledge to predict such DGAs. After
deploying the classifier for 12 days, we retrained the classifier with additional DGA fami-
lies observed from the network. After retraining, our classifier has successfully identified
the following new variants with high confidence: DGA E-v2 and DGA E-v3.
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